Interest Rate Setting by the ECB: Words and Deeds

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Abstract

This paper discusses interest-rate setting by the ECB between 1999 and 2004. I develop from the Monthly Bulletins quantitative indicators of the Governing Council’s assessment of inflation, economic activity, and M3 growth, and investigate their impact on interest rate decisions. I also estimate reaction functions with ordered probit techniques, using the Monthly Bulletins to guide the choice of variables to be incorporated in the analysis. The results show that the ECB reacts strongly to economic sentiment indicators as measures of the state of the real economy. Furthermore, I find statistically significant reactions to inflation and M3 growth.

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1. Introduction

With the ECB – or, more correctly, its Governing Council – having conducted monetary policy since January 1999, it is timely to consider its interest rate setting behaviour. While a number of authors have sought to do so by estimating empirical reaction functions of the Taylor variety, these are subject to several potentially important shortcomings.

First and most obviously, because the euro was introduced so recently, some studies use solely data from before 1999 while others combine data from before and after the introduction of Economic and Monetary Union.¹ Since there was no single monetary policy maker in (what came to be) the euro area before 1999, estimated reaction functions based on pre-1999 data do not provide clean estimates of the Governing Council’s reaction function. In order to provide such estimates it is critical to use solely data from 1999 onwards.

Second, many studies capture the stance of monetary policy by a short-term interbank rate, rather than the ECB’s repo rate that serves as its main policy instrument.² This is, of course, also related to the fact that many studies use pre-1999 data, which necessitates the use of an interbank rate as a proxy for the policy rate. However, interbank rates are influenced by market expectations of future monetary policy that could impact on the results. For instance, if inflation rises market participants may expect monetary policy to be tightened. This would lead to an increase in interbank rates without policy being changed and, potentially, without policy makers having any intention of doing so. Thus, empirical reaction functions estimated on market determined interbank rates are in fact a convolution of the policy reaction function and market expectations thereof. It is therefore desirable to focus on the ECB’s repo rate which only changes as a result of explicit policy decisions.

¹ For instance, Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) investigate synthetic data for the euro area economics ending in 1998:4, that is, before EMU was established. Peersman and Smets (1998) estimate Taylor rules on data ending in December 1997 for an aggregate of five euro area economies.
Third, empirical reaction functions, for the euro area and other economies, are typically estimated using OLS or some instrumental-variables technique. While this is appropriate when studying the determination of interbank rates, it is less attractive when policy rates are studied. The reason for this is that in most months policymakers do in fact not change interest rates. When they do, furthermore, they change them by discrete amounts, typically 0.25% or 0.50%. It is for this reason more appropriate to estimate ordered probit models that distinguish between months in which interest rates were raised, left unchanged, or reduced.

In addition to these shortcomings, there is a deeper issue whether econometric studies that focus on the ECB’s deeds are likely to be fully informative about the way the Governing Council sets interest rates. Empirical reaction functions link observations of interest rates with data on macroeconomic variables that the central bank is assumed to react to. While undoubtedly of interest, this approach disregards the fact that the policy makers’ assessment of the information contained in these macroeconomic variables may vary over time. For instance, while central banks typically react to movements in headline inflation, the extent to which they do so may depend on whether they expect them to be temporary or permanent. A given change in the rate of inflation can therefore elicit a range of interest rate responses. To understand better the ECB’s policy decisions, it would be helpful to seek to understand how the Governing Council interprets incoming data. It is possible to do so by studying public statements of the ECB regarding macroeconomic developments, that is, by also studying the words of the ECB.

The purpose of this paper is to extend the literature on empirical reaction functions in the euro area in two ways. First, the paper exploits the information in statements made in the ECB’s Monthly Bulletins to develop indicators capturing the Governing Council’s assessment of inflation pressures, developments in real economic activity, and growth of M3. The paper studies how these qualitative measures evolve over time, and how they are related to decisions to change the repo rate.

The Monthly Bulletins are also of interest because they help understand what variables the Governing Council responds to in conducting policy. For instance, empirical reaction functions estimated on euro area data typically use either a measure of the output gap constructed from data on real GDP or an index of industrial production to explore how the ECB responds to changes in real activity. However, the
statements in the Monthly Bulletins never refer to output gaps and suggest instead that the Governing Council attaches great weight to measures of business and consumer confidence. For this reason the paper uses measure of economic sentiment in the econometric analysis.

Second, the paper studies the information in the ECB’s statements and actions by estimating empirical interest rate reaction functions. To avoid intermingling the ECB and the pre-ECB periods, the sample period starts in January 1999, when the ECB started to set interest rates in the euro area. Furthermore, changes in the repo rate as evidence of policy action and the reaction functions are estimated using ordered probit techniques. Finally, I use the indicator variables discussed above, before considering more variables as regressors in the models.

Two other, but less novel, aspects of the paper warrant mentioning. While other studies have also focussed on the post-1998 data, these were based on shorter sample periods during which the great bulk of policy changes were in the same direction. By contrast, this paper is based on a sample that covers a sufficiently long time period to capture a full interest rate “cycle.” This may render the results more reliable than those obtained from shorter samples. Furthermore, the paper uses monthly data. While this seems natural given the frequency by which interest rates in the euro area are changed, many studies use quarterly data, most likely because data on real GDP, which are required to estimate the output gap, are only available on a quarterly basis.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses how the Editorials are used to construct the indicator variables, and what can learned from them regarding the Governing Council’s choice of information variables. Measures of economic “sentiment” figure prominently in the in the review of real economic developments in the Monthly Bulletin, in contrast to output gaps that play an important role in empirical estimates of monetary policy reaction functions. I demonstrate that, perhaps surprisingly, a measure of economic sentiment in the euro area compiled by the European Commission is strongly correlated with standard measures of the output gap about a year ahead.

Section 3 looks at the relationship between the indicator variables constructed from the Monthly Bulletins and formal measures of inflation, real economic activity and money growth. I find that while the indicator variable capturing the Governing
Council’s view of the outlook for activity is strongly correlated with several direct measures thereof, the indicator variables for inflation and money growth are much less closely tied to a range of inflation variables and the growth rate of M3.

Section 4 the analysis turns to the econometric work. I first estimate ordered probit models on the indicator variables constructed from the Monthly Bulletins and show these are informative about interest rate decisions. Turning to data on inflation, real economic activity and money growth, I show that the economic sentiment variable appears better able to account for the Governing Council’s interest rate decisions that other variables capturing real economic activity. Among the inflation variables, headline inflation appears better able than alternative measures of price changes to explain interest rate changes.

The main finding in this section, however, is that money growth is statistically significant in the reaction functions. Interestingly, the results show that while money growth was not an important factor explaining repo rate changes under normal conditions, money was important in situations in which sentiment was strong.

Finally, Section 5 concludes.

2. Preliminaries

The econometric research that has been undertaken on the interest rate setting by the ECB has focussed on estimating empirical reaction functions, typically using data on interest rates, output gap and inflation. While such quantitative analysis is valuable, it disregards the potentially important fact that a central bank’s response to, say, inflation, does not only depend on the observed change in prices but also on policy makers’ interpretation of the data. For instance, a central bank may choose not to react to an increase in inflation that is due to a depreciation of the exchange rate under the argument that this is a price level shock that only impacts temporarily on inflation. By contrast, it may react strongly to an increase in inflation that is due to an increase in wage inflation, which may contain a more permanent element. To understand the ECB’s interest rate setting it is therefore desirable also to consider qualitative information that captures the Governing Council’s judgement about the outlook for inflation and economic activity.
To do so, I construct indicator variables of the Governing Council’s view of the outlook of the economy by reading the Editorials of the Monthly Bulletin of the ECB in the period between January 1999 and June 2004. The reason for focussing on the Editorials, rather than the full report, is as follows. The Monthly Bulletins contain an exhaustive analysis of macroeconomic conditions in the euro area. While there is little doubt that the members of the Governing Council are in general agreement with that analysis, it is arguably best interpreted as expressing the views of the ECB’s senior staff. By contrast, the Editorials cover the first 2-3 pages of the report, contain a short explanation for why interest rates were or were not changed in the previous month and frequently include a summary statement of the Governing Council’s view of the economy. For instance, in June 1999 it states that “…the Governing Council did not consider that recent monetary developments were indicative of future price pressures” (page 5) and in January 2000 it notes that “…recent data confirm the Governing Council’s previous assessment regarding the outlook…” (page 6). For these reasons and given its prominence in the report, the Editorial must receive considerable scrutiny by the members of the Governing Council. In what follows I therefore rely on the Editorials to construct the indicator variables.

To proceed, I next discuss the construction of the indicator variables and review what can be learned from the Editorials about the Governing Council’s views about the relative importance of alternative information variables. Since that analysis suggests that survey measures of economic “confidence” or “sentiment”, rather than the output gap, play an important role in the ECB’s conduct of policy, I explore whether the two variables may in fact contain similar information.

2.1 Construction of the indicator variables

The discussion of the risks to price stability in the Editorials is structured in three parts. There is a discussion of the behaviour of real activity, presumably because the Governing Council views this an important determinant of future inflation, recent inflation trends and monetary developments in the euro area. These three parts are used to construct indicator variables intended to capture the Governing Council’s views of the about the “risks to price stability” arising from recent developments in economy activity, realised inflation and M3 growth. While there is little evidence that central banks react to monetary growth (in the narrow sense that money growth is
typically insignificant in empirical reaction functions), the ECB has emphasised the importance of M3 growth for its policy decisions. It is therefore particularly interesting to explore if information about the Governing Council’s assessment of money growth helps understand policy changes.

The indicator variables can take five values: -2, -1, 0, 1 and 2. The Appendix provides summary statements drawn from the Editorials to illustrate why the indicator variables were changed. The value of zero should be interpreted as the Editorial suggests that the Governing Council believes that given the current level of the repo rate, a change in the level of interest rates is not warranted. To understand this better, it is helpful to consider some concrete examples. For instance, the Editorial in the first Monthly Bulletin in January 1999 states that “on balance, the evidence suggests that there are no indications of significant upward or downward pressures on price developments...” and goes on to argue that “Overall ... the outlook for price developments can be regarded as being broadly balanced.” Since the Editorial more generally suggests that the Governing Council viewed inflation over 12 months as stable at the then current rate of 0.9%, the assessment of price pressures is coded as 0.

The value –1 indicates that the Editorial suggests that the behaviour of the variable may warrant a relaxation of the policy, that is, the current level of the repo rate is too high. For instance, the April 1999 Monthly Bulletin notes that “many projections for inflation rates in the euro area have been revised downwards recently.” Moreover, the Editorial states that “downward pressure on inflation stems from the current economic situation.” Since this and the overall reading of the Editorial suggests that the Governing Council’s assessment of price pressures had changed and the Governing Council had become more concerned that inflation might fall too low, the inflation indicator is coded as –1.

The value –2 is meant to capture that the Governing Council appears increasingly persuaded that the behaviour of the variable in question warrants a cut in policy. Consider, for instance, the Governing Council’s assessment of real economic activity in early 1999. In January 1999 the Editorial discusses “expectations of a slowdown in

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3 It should be emphasised that the coding was done by reading the full Editorials and that the statements in the Appendix only serve to provide a brief background to the coding.
the growth of economic activity in the short term” (coded as –1) and in February it notes that “while there are indications of a slowdown in real GDP growth, the extent and duration of such a weakening of economic activity remain a matter of uncertainty” (also coded as –1). By contrast, in the March issue the tone had sharpened, as it had become clearer to the Governing Council that real economic activity was indeed slowing and that it was doing so more rapidly than it had anticipated earlier. This is indicated by the phrasing “recent information on indicators of economic activity ... provided evidence of a sizeable slowdown in the fourth quarter of 1998” and “the deterioration of confidence has continued into 1990.” For these reasons I code this as –2. The values +1 and +2 are applied in cases in which in the Governing Council appears to be somewhat or strongly concerned that developments in inflation, real economic activity or M3 growth warrant a tightening of policy.

In interpreting these indicator variables it should be emphasised that they (are intended to) capture the Governing Council’s assessment whether some variable suggests that a change in policy is warranted, which does not necessarily map into the actual behaviour of some macroeconomic aggregate in an obvious or unique way. Thus, while one expects these indicators to be correlated with more objective measures of inflation, economic activity and money growth, one would not necessarily expect the correlations to be very high. Indeed, the rationale for using them, that objective data are not fully informative about the Governing Council’s view of the economy, is that the correlations is not too high.

In Section 3 below I plot the indicator variables and discuss how they relate to macroeconomic data.

2.2 The Governing Council’s choice of information variables

A further reason why it is helpful to read the Editorials is that they provide information about how the Governing Council views the economic environment and help condition the choice of variables in the econometric analysis conducted below. Four points deserve special attention.

First, while data on price and monetary developments are available with little delay, the data on real economic conditions, in particular real GDP, are subject to longer lags and more uncertainty. Indeed, comments in the Editorials on the behaviour on real
GDP refer to developments that occurred several months ago. For instance, in commenting on Eurostat’s first estimate of real GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2003, the March 2004 Editorial states: “These data confirm that a gradual recovery in economic activity in the euro area took place in the second half of 2003. More recent indicators, including those from business and consumer surveys, point to a moderate economic growth also in early 2004.” This suggests that estimates of output gaps, which are typically used in empirical reaction functions, are unlikely to play much of a role in actual interest rate setting (although, of course, they may be highly significant in empirical reaction functions). However, and as is clear from the quote above, in discussing recent developments in real economic activity, the Editorials refer to indications coming from a wide variety of sources, and frequently comment on measures of consumer and business confidence. For this reason I use an Economic Sentiment Indicator, developed by the European Commission, in the econometric analysis below, which is available with a very short time lag. Several other measures of real economic activity are also considered.

Second, while the ECB has not adopted any measure of core inflation, the Editorials often discuss the behaviour of HICP inflation excluding energy and unprocessed food prices. I therefore use the data and the CPI weights provided in the statistical section of the Monthly Bulletins to construct this measure of inflation which I, for simplicity, refer to as “core” inflation below. Since the discussion in the Editorials focuses on the annual change in prices, headline and core inflation are measured over twelve months in the discussion below.

Third, as is readily apparent from the Editorials, the Governing Council sets monetary policy in a forward-looking manner. This is evidenced by, for instance, the fact that

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4 References to Orphanides.
5 The economic sentiment index pertains to euro area. It is based on surveys of firms and consumers conducted at the national level. The data sample is very large: for the EU it is based on a sample of 68,000 firms and 27,000 consumers. The monthly surveys are carried out in the first two weeks of the month (for a limited number of items a quarterly survey is done). The sentiment indicator attaches a weight of 40% to the industrial confidence indicator, 20% to the consumer confidence indicator, 20% to the construction confidence indicator and the 20% to the retail trade confidence indicator. The sentiment indicator takes values close to 100, I subtract 100 from it in order to facilitate the graphical presentation. For more information about the index, see: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/business_consumer_surveys/userguide_en.pdf The data can be downloaded from:
policy decisions are discussed in the context of the Governing Council’s view of “the outlook for price stability”. This suggests that backward-looking indicators, such as realised inflation rates, may not be very helpful for understanding the ECB’s interest-rate decisions. Furthermore, it makes it desirable to use measures of expected future economic conditions in estimating reaction functions. For this reason I use a measure of expected inflation and real GDP growth over the coming 12 months, computed using data tabulated in the Economist. It should be noted that in a perfectly credible monetary policy regime, the expected rate of inflation would always equal the targeted level, which I in the ECB’s case interpret to be somewhere in the range of 1.5-2%. If so, interest rate changes would be difficult to explain given inflation expectations.

Fourth, while money and credit growth both appear important in the Governing Council’s thinking about policy, the official position of the ECB is that M3 growth is the single most important indicator of monetary developments. I therefore focus on this variable in the econometric analysis. Since the Editorials suggest that the Governing Council’s deliberation focuses on the three-month moving average of the annual rate of money growth, this definition is used the empirical analysis below.

As an aside it is interesting to note that the Editorials highlight how pervasive the uncertainty about the state of the economy is. They typically lists the main factors suggesting that inflation may be rising or economic conditions strengthening, and continue by reviewing the considerations that indicate the opposite. Moreover, the commentaries suggest that the Governing Council may over- or underpredict some aspect of the economy for several months. Overall this points to uncertainty about the state of the economy as a major factor why interest rate smoothing occurs.

2.3 Economic Sentiment Indicator

As noted above, the Governing Council makes frequent references to indicators of economic sentiment in its discussion of real economic conditions. Estimates of the


6 Explain how this is computed.
7 By interest rate smoothing I mean the fact the lagged interest rate typically is highly significant in empirical reaction functions.
output gap, by contrast, do not appear to play any role in the analysis, presumably because real GDP data are reported with long lags and are subject to large revisions. Since the empirical literature on central bank reaction functions, following Taylor (1993), sees the output gap as playing a primary role in interest rate decisions, I next seek to understand the relationship between the economic sentiment indicator discussed above and output gaps.

To do so, I compute two estimates of the output gap, using real GDP data for the euro area for the period 1991:1 to 2004:1. The first of these is calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, setting the smoothing parameter equal to 1600. The second estimate is obtained by applying a band-pass filter, extracting the information in the frequency band corresponding to periodicity of between 16 and 32 quarters, to the level of the logarithm of real GDP. Since the output gaps are measured in percentage points, I define the sentiment indicate as the percentage deviation from its mean in the sample period.\(^8\)

Figure 1 contains a time series plot of the sentiment indicator and the output gap series. Since the series have very different amplitude, I normalised them to have zero mean and unit variance. A notable aspect of the figure is that sentiment and the output gaps evolve over time in much the same way. For instance, they all point to a trough in economic activity in 1993 and to a peak in 2000. Sentiment can thus be thought of as a rapidly available indicator of the output gap. To shed more light on information content of sentiment, Figure 2 contains cross-correlations between the current level of sentiment and past and future levels of the two output gaps, together with a 95% confidence band. The figure shows that sentiment is negatively correlated with past output gaps, but positively correlated with the current output gap and strongly correlated with future output gaps. Overall, the two figures indicate that sentiment provides a forecast of the output gap three or four quarters ahead. Since the sentiment data are available with a very short lag and are not revised, these findings suggest that it makes good sense for the Governing Council to use sentiment as a forward-looking indicator of real activity.

\(^8\) That is, I use \(100 \times \log(s/s^*)\), where \(s\) denotes the sentiment indicator, and \(s^*\) its mean. The quarterly data on sentiment is obtained by using the data point in the first month.
3. **A look at the data**

In this section I review the indicator variables constructed from the Editorials and macroeconomic data on inflation, real economic activity and money growth. The purpose of this analysis is to understand how closely these variables are related to more objective measures of economic conditions. The indicator variables are available in Table 1.

3.1 **Inflation**

It is useful to start by considering the Governing Council’s assessment of inflation. Figure 3 contains plots of the inflation indicator together with realised and expected future inflation constructed from the data published by *The Economist*. The dashed line at 2% indicates the upper limit of the ECB’s definition of price stability.

The Editorials suggest that the concerns the Governing Council expressed about declining inflation in the spring of 1999 before the interest cut in April, soon gave way to worries that inflation risks had increased. This coincided with rising headline and expected future inflation. In late 2000 and in early 2001 the Editorials suggest that the Governing Council viewed inflation risks as having become more balanced, despite that fact that headline inflation was generally above 2%. However, that judgement looked appropriate as headline and expected future inflation declined during the later part of 2001. With headline and expected future inflation rising towards the end of the year and in early 2002, the Governing Council indicated again concerns about inflation development in the Editorials in the middle of 2002 as expected inflation started to rise towards the 2% level. But with inflation staying just above, and expected inflation just below, 2%, the Governing Council soon again judged the risks more balanced, and maintained that judgement until June 2004 when the sample ends. In Figure 4 I plot the inflation indicator together with core inflation and the difference between headline and core inflation. Note that the inflation indicator does not appear to be strongly tied to either of these variables.

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9 Alesina et al. (2001) and Begg et al. (2001) used data from The Economist to compute measures of expected future inflation, but not output (as is done below).
The above analysis of the Governing Council’s assessment of inflation stability suggests that there is a considerable wedge between realised inflation and the ECB’s judgement of the outlook for price stability. However, since the ECB also reacts to other variables, I postpone a discussion of what to infer from this for the moment.

3.2 Real economic activity

While the overriding objective of the ECB is to ensure price stability, the Editorials contain frequent statements about developments in real economic activity, presumably because it impacts on the rate of inflation with a lag. Figure 5 shows the indicator variable together the sentiment indicator (scaled by 0.1 for comparison purposes) and the expected real GDP growth in the coming twelve months constructed from data published by the Economist. The figure shows a striking correlation between the indicator and the sentiment and expected GDP growth series (the correlation is in both cases 0.81). Furthermore, the correlation between the sentiment and expected output growth is even higher, 0.94, which further supports the view that sentiment captures expected future growth in the economy.

In Figure 6 I plot the indicator variable together with the growth rate of industrial production over twelve months, and EuroCOIN, a monthly real-time indicator of euro area business cycles published by the CEPR. Since the industrial production data are subject to some month-to-month volatility, I use a three-month moving average, which appears to be the ECB’s standard “filter” to reduce volatility, of the series. This figure also shows a relatively tight link between the Governing Council’s assessment of real economic activity and the industrial production and the EuroCOIN indicator, although the correlations are lower than in the previous figure.

Again I emphasise that real GDP growth or the output gap are not included in the analysis since the Editorials suggest that these variables do play much of a role in the Governing Council’s assessment of inflation risks. Real GDP growth serves mainly to provide ex post assessments of judgements about activity made by the Governing Council some quarters earlier.

10 See www.cepr.org/data/EuroCOIN for more information.
3.3 Money growth

Since the ECB has repeatedly stated that it attaches a prominent role to money in conducting monetary policy, I turn to its interpretation of movements in M3 growth. Figure 7 contains a plot of the indicator variable for money together with (a three-month average of) M3 growth over twelve months. For clarity, the 4.5% “reference value” for money growth that the ECB has announced is also indicated. The figure suggests that while the Governing Council viewed money growth as indicating risks to price stability between mid-1999 and late 2000, it has subsequently not done so, except during a brief period in 2002, despite the fact that money growth has exceeded the reference value since early 2001. As is clear from its statements in the Editorial, the reason for this is, effectively, that the rapid increase in money growth reflected largely increases in the demand for money, and therefore did not generate inflation risks.

3.4 Repo rate

Finally, Figure 8 shows the repo rate in the sample period. Figures 4 to 6 suggest that the interest rate reduction in the spring of 1999 was due to the Governing Council coming to the view that activity was slowing and inflation pressures receding. This was followed from summer onwards by an economic expansion that the Governing Council interpreted as generating upside risks to price stability and it consequently raised the repo rate. This process halted in the middle of 2000, and during the 2001 activity slowed and the Governing Council’s assessment of inflation risks turned increasingly benign, which led to a series of cuts in interest rates. In late 2001, however, as sentiment started to improve, the Governing Council took a more neutral view of the implications for inflation and kept interest rates constant. Interestingly, the growth of industrial production and the expectations of future economic growth only started to recover some months later. During 2002, the resumption of growth soon gave way to a worsening sentiment and downward revisions of expected future growth which led the Governing Council concluded that the downward risks to price stability had risen.

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11 Interestingly, estimated cross-correlations for both this and longer sample periods shows that the
Overall, it is possible to account for the rises in interest rates in 1999-2000 by appealing to inflation pressures and rapid real economic growth, and the reduction in 2001-2003 by considering weakness in real economic activity in a situation in which headline inflation was fluctuating around 2%. This raises the question of what role the Governing Council’s views of money growth played for its interest rate decisions. As a preliminary to the analysis below, it should be noted that the inflation and money growth indicators differed in only five of the 66 months between January 1999 and June 2004. This suggests that it will be difficult to distinguish between their relative importance.

3.5 Conclusions

The above analysis suggests a number of conclusions that have a bearing on the econometric work that follows.

First, the link between realised and expected future inflation rates on the one hand and the Governing Council’s outlook for inflation on the other is not close. As suggested earlier, this is likely because inflation is a backward-looking variable while monetary policy is inherently forward looking. Furthermore, it seems likely that the ECB’s analysis of future inflation, which is conditional on the current level of interest rates, is at times quite different from private sector inflation forecasts, which are conditional on policy reactions in response to too high or low inflation.

Second, there are strong correlations between data on, and the Governing Council’s assessment of, real economic activity.

Third, the relationship between money growth and interest rates appears complex. Since the Governing Council has repeatedly stated that it attaches “a prominent role” to monetary developments as an indicator of “risks to price stability”, one would perhaps have expected that high money growth would have been associated with high or rising interest rates. The opposite appears to be the case: periods of above-average interest rates are associated with money growth below average and vice versa. No doubt, this observation is one reason why many observers have questioned the ECB’s statement that it does, in fact, pay attention to money growth in setting interest rates.

EuroCOIN indicator leads the other measures of real economic activity.
However, the ECB’s claim that money growths plays an important role in its interest rate decisions presumably means that, conditional on the information embedded in inflation and economic activity, it reacts to money growth. If so, the bivariate relationship between money growth and the repo rate provides little evidence on the issue whether the ECB responds to money growth. Multivariate reaction functions, in which inflation and real activity are included in the analysis, are likely to be more informative.

4. Interest-rate setting by the ECB

4.1 Estimates in the literature

The Taylor rule, which was initially proposed by Taylor (1993) as a device to understand the monetary policy in the United States in the late 1980s and early 1990s, has been applied to data from the euro area by very large number of authors. While it goes beyond the goals of this paper to summarise the literature, it is useful to distinguish between four branches of the literature.

The first of these use the Taylor rule, or empirical reaction function of the Taylor-rule form, to study the behaviour of short-term interest rates before the introduction of monetary union and a single monetary policy (e.g., Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) and Peersman and Smets (1999). The goal in these papers is form a view as to how the ECB might conduct policy.

poorly out of sample. By contrast, reaction functions specified in error-correction form are not subject to these problems.¹²

Third, a number of authors estimate empirical reaction functions in order to close and simulate econometric models of the euro area.¹³ For instance, such reaction functions are incorporated in the ECB’s area-wide model of the euro area (see Fagan et al. (2001) and are used by Clausen and Hayo (2002)). The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model presented by Smets and Wouters (2002) also comprises a version of the empirical reaction function.¹⁴ Since these papers focus more on understanding the euro area economy than interest-rate setting by the ECB, these authors typically study data from before and after the introduction of monetary union.

Fourth, some authors use the Taylor rule to understand the ECB’s interest rate setting. For instance, see the reports in the CEPR series on “Monitoring the European Central Bank” (see Begg et al. (1998, 2002), Alesina et al. (2001) and Favero et al. (2000)) and Faust et al. (2001). These studies were written before there was sufficient data to estimate a reaction function solely for the ECB period, and use calibrated reaction functions, or reaction functions estimated for the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve, to understand the ECB’s monetary policy.

While interesting, the literature is subject to the weakness that it do not formally study data from the period after the ECB started to conduct monetary policy. As such, they do not provide much evidence on interest rate setting by the ECB. The fifth strand of the literature uses data from January 1999 onwards to provide estimates of Governing Council’s reaction function. Breuss (2002), Neumann (2001 and 2002), Ullrich (2003) and Hayo (2002), typically using the overnight rate, headline CPI and an output gap constructed by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to industrial production data. One interesting finding in this literature is that “… ECB’s monetary policy is not just

¹² She also follows Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a and b) and extracts an estimate of long-run inflation expectations from the term-structure of interest rates, and shows that this is significant in the reaction function.

¹³ Coenen and Wieland (2000) study a three-equation model of euro area comprising a calibrated Taylor rule together with an inflation equation and an aggregate demand equation.

¹⁴ However, the output gap is in this model measured by the wedge between the actual and the flexible price level of output, which is more attractive from a theoretical perspective, rather than by more traditional levels of the gap.
guided by the price stability objective but to a considerable degree also tries to stabilise the business cycle” (Neumann, 2001, p. 14).

Two of the papers in this literature are related to the present study. Heinemann and Hüfner (2004) estimate reaction functions for the period January 1999 – April 2002 and reaction functions using both traditional methods and ordered probit techniques. They distinguish between months in which the Governing Council increases, leaves unchanged and cuts interest rates. Carstensen (2003) estimated ordered probit equations for the level of the repo rate, and also finds strong responses to output and weak responses to inflation. Interestingly, he finds that a range of measures of money growth, money gaps, and monetary overhangs are significant in the reaction functions.

4.2 Estimates: Preliminaries

Since the Governing Council leaves the repo rate unchanged in most months, it is inappropriate to fit the model using OLS. Below I follow Carstensen (2003) and Heinemann and Hüfner (2004) and estimate ordered probit models on data for the euro area. As is shown in Table 2, the repo rate was changed on fifteen occasions in the sample period: it was raised seven times and cut eight times. More interestingly, on eight occasions the change was ±0.25%, and on eight occasions it was ±0.50%. It is therefore of interest to make a distinction between “small” and “large” changes in interest rates. The dependent variable in the models takes the value 2 (1) in the months in which the repo rate was raised by 0.5% (0.25%), zero in the months it was left unchanged and −1 (−2) in the months in which it was reduced by 0.25% (0.50%). The resulting indicator for the repo rate is available in Table 1.

Before turning to the empirical work, it is useful to consider the underpinnings for the estimated equation in greater detail. Let $i_t$ denote the repo rate at time $t$ and $i^*_t$ the desired repo rate at time $t$. These may differ because of the practice of the ECB (and many other central banks) of setting interest rates at discrete levels, typically 0.25% apart. Let $\pi_t$, $y_t$ and $\mu_t$ denote (some measure of) inflation, real economic activity and money growth. Consider next the standard reaction function:

\[
  i^*_t = \alpha_\pi \pi_t + \alpha_y y_t + \alpha_\mu \mu_t + \alpha_i i_{t-1} + \epsilon_t
\]
where \( 0 \leq \alpha_i \leq 1 \), the constant is omitted and \( e_t \) is a residual. Rewrite this equation as:

\[
(2) \quad i_t^* - i_{t-1} = \alpha^\top x_t + e_t
\]

where \( x_t^\top = [\pi_t, y_t, \mu_t, i_{t-1}] \) and \( \alpha^\top = [\alpha_x, \alpha_y, \alpha_\mu, \bar{\alpha}_i] \), where \( \bar{\alpha}_i \equiv \alpha_i - 1 \). In the model below I use a somewhat more elaborate version of this model that incorporates the lagged change in the interest rate (see Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and Dueker (1999)).

In equation (2), the term \( i_t^* - i_{t-1} \), which can be interpreted as the desired change in the repo rate, constitutes the latent variable in the probit analysis. Suppose, in the interest of realism, that the central bank only changes the actual repo rate in steps of 0.25%. Since the Governing Council only changed the repo rate by 0.25% or 0.50% (in absolute value) in the sample period, only five outcomes of the policy deliberations are observed:

\[
\begin{align*}
  i_t^* - i_{t-1} &= -0.50\% \quad \text{if } i_t^* - i_{t-1} \leq \gamma_1 \\
  i_t^* - i_{t-1} &= -0.25\% \quad \text{if } \gamma_1 < i_t^* - i_{t-1} \leq \gamma_2 \\
  i_t^* - i_{t-1} &= 0 \quad \quad \text{if } \gamma_2 < i_t^* - i_{t-1} \leq \gamma_3 \\
  i_t^* - i_{t-1} &= +0.25\% \quad \text{if } \gamma_3 < i_t^* - i_{t-1} \leq \gamma_4 \\
  i_t^* - i_{t-1} &= +0.50\% \quad \text{if } \gamma_4 < i_t^* - i_{t-1}
\end{align*}
\]

The actual change in the repo rate depends on the change in the desired repo rate, relative to the limit points, given by the \( \gamma_i \)'s, that are estimated together with the elements of the \( \alpha \) vector below.

In the ordered probit model, the probabilities are given by:

\[
\begin{align*}
  \Pr(i_t^* - i_{t-1} = -0.50\%) &= \Phi(\gamma_1 - \alpha^\top x) \\
  \Pr(i_t^* - i_{t-1} = -0.25\%) &= \Phi(\gamma_2 - \alpha^\top x) - \Phi(\gamma_1 - \alpha^\top x) \\
  \Pr(i_t^* - i_{t-1} = 0) &= \Phi(\gamma_3 - \alpha^\top x) - \Phi(\gamma_2 - \alpha^\top x) \\
  \Pr(i_t^* - i_{t-1} = +0.25\%) &= \Phi(\gamma_4 - \alpha^\top x) - \Phi(\gamma_3 - \alpha^\top x) \\
  \Pr(i_t^* - i_{t-1} = +0.50\%) &= \Phi(\gamma_4 - \alpha^\top x)
\end{align*}
\]
\[ \Pr(i_t^* - i_{t-1} = \pm 0.50\%) = 1 - \Phi(\gamma_5 - \alpha^T x) \]

where \( \Phi \) is the cumulative distribution for a normal variable and the \( \gamma_i \)'s are unknown limit points to be estimated jointly with \( \alpha \).

To interpret the results below, it is useful to study more formally the impact on the probabilities of changes in \( x \). To do so, consider the derivatives of the first, last and one of the “intermediate” probabilities, for instance, the probability of no change in the interest rate. These are given by:

(5a) \[ \frac{\partial \Phi(\gamma_1 - \alpha^T x)}{\partial x} = -\phi(\alpha^T x) \alpha \]

(5b) \[ \frac{\partial [1 - \Phi(\gamma_5 - \alpha^T x)]}{\partial x} = \phi(\gamma_5 - \alpha^T x) \alpha \]

(5c) \[ \frac{\partial [\Phi(\gamma_3 - \alpha^T x) - \Phi(\gamma_2 - \alpha^T x)]}{\partial x} = [\phi(\gamma_3 - \alpha^T x) - \phi(\gamma_2 - \alpha^T x)] \alpha \]

where \( \phi(\bullet) \) denotes the density corresponding to a standard normal. These derivatives warrant three comments. First, note that the change in the probabilities depend on \( \phi(\bullet) \alpha \). Thus, the slope parameters do not on their own indicate how sensitive the probabilities are to changes in \( x \). Second, note that the derivatives are given by the slope parameters times a term common to all derivatives of the probability in question. The ratio of the derivatives is therefore equal to the ratio of the slope parameters. Thus, if the ratio of the slope parameter for inflation to parameter for the repo rate is larger than unity (in absolute value), the probability is more sensitive to a one-percentage point change in inflation than to an identical change of the repo rate.

Third, assuming that the elements of \( \alpha \) are all positive, note that an increase in \( x \) unambiguously reduces the probability of the “lowest” outcome and increases the probability of the “highest” outcome. The impact on the probability of the “intermediate” outcome is, however, unclear. Thus, the signs of the parameters in the ordered probit models show whether an increase in the regressors makes it more or less likely that the Governing Council will cut or raise the repo rate by 0.50%. They will not on their own say anything, however, about how the probabilities that the Governing Council will alter interest rates by \( \pm 0.25\% \) or leave monetary policy unaffected will change.
4.3 Estimates with indicator variables

Before estimating the reaction functions using macro economic data, it is of interest to explore the information content for interest rate changes of the indicator variables developed above. Since these variables signal whether the Governing Council felt that, given the interest rate, the outlook for inflation or real economic activity, or realised M3 growth, warranted a change in interest rate, the lagged level of the repo rate is included in the equations. Furthermore, last month’s policy decision may impacts on the current decision. For instance, under interest rate smoothing, the coefficient on the lagged change of the repo rate should be positive. Alternatively, it could enter with a negative coefficient if an increase in interest rates last month reduces the probability of an increase this month. To explore this, the regressions incorporate the lagged change in the interest rate as an independent variable.

There are thus five regressors in the probit model: the lagged repo rate, the lagged change in the repo rate, the indicator for inflation, the indicator for real economic activity and the indicator for money growth. If the repo rate were mean reverting, we would expect the lagged repo rate to have a negative sign. The lagged change in the repo rate could have either sign, and the three indicator variables are expected to have positive signs.

Table 3 presents the estimates. To allow for the lagged change in the repo rate, the sample period starts in February 1999 and ends in June 2004. The first column reports results including all the indicator variables discussed above. Note that the parameter on the lagged repo rate is highly significant and negative, indicating that the probability of an increase in the interest rate depends negatively on the level of rates. Furthermore, the lagged change in the repo rate is highly significant and the parameter is negative. Thus, an increase in the repo rate last month reduces the probability of an increase this month.

The results show that the outlook for real economic activity has a positive and significant coefficient, indicating that better economic prospects makes the Governing Council more likely to raise the repo rates. By contrast, the outlook for inflation and the assessment of money growth have positive parameters but are insignificant. However, since these evolve in a similar way over time, it is possible that the parameter estimates are subject to multicollinearity. I therefore drop the money
growth indicator and reestimate the model. The results in the second column are similar to those in the first, except that the inflation indicator is significant at the 10% level and has a larger parameter than before. The pseudo r-squared falls trivially.

Next, the model is re-estimated and the indicator for inflation is dropped. The coefficient on the money indicator is about as large and about as significant as the coefficient on the inflation indicator in the second column, and the other coefficient estimates remain similar. These results support the notion that the insignificance of money growth and inflation in the first column is due to multicollinearity.

To summarise, the results in Table 3 suggest that the Governing Council’s assessment of economic conditions and the outlook are systematically related to their interest rate decisions. Furthermore, the repo rate is mean reverting, and that a change in interest rates last period reduces the likelihood of a similar change this period.

4.4 Preliminary estimates with macro variables

I new reestimate the ordered probit models using direct measures of inflation, real economic activity and money growth as independent variables. There are two reasons why this is an interesting exercise. First, the indicator variables are at best crude measures of the Governing Council’s views of the economy, which may explain why the significance of the inflation and money growth indicators is so low when they are included individually. Better estimates may therefore be obtained using data on inflation, real economic activity and money growth. Second, by using macroeconomic variables it is possible to form a view of the factors that impact on the Governing Council’s policy decisions. For instance, how important does sentiment appear to be relative to industrial production in accounting for repo rate changes?

The models estimated below include the lagged repo rate and the change in the repo rate, which were significant in the regressions in Table 3, as regressors. Since the Governing Council appears to focus on the three-month moving average of the annual growth rate of M3, this variable is also incorporated among the independent variables. Moreover, I include the rate of HICP inflation, which the ECB’s inflation objective is defined in terms of, and use the sentiment indicator since it appears frequently in the Editorials and since it strongly correlated with the indicator variable for real economic activity. Since the variables are reported with a time lag, the regressors are lagged by one month.
The results in the first column in Table 4 are encouraging in that all variables are significant at the five-percent level and have the expected signs. Thus, higher inflation, stronger sentiment and faster money growth all increase the probability of a large interest rate increase and reduce the likelihood of a large cut. To get a sense of whether the “Taylor principle” holds, suppose that inflation rose one percentage point above its mean. How much must the repo rate have to increase in order to keep the probability of an interest rate change unchanged?\textsuperscript{15} In the case of the model in column 1 in Table 4 this increase is given by \(-1.24/-1.00 = 1.24\). While the Taylor principle thus held in the present data set, it should be noted that the hypothesis that the ratio is unity is not rejected (\(p = 0.59\)).

It is well established in the literature that the ECB appears to respond to inflation and real economic activity. However, with the exceptions of Carstensen (2003), who uses data from January 1999 onwards, and Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2003), who also uses data starting in 1985, I am not aware of any studies that find that money growth impacts on the ECB’s interest rate setting. Indeed, a number of observers have argued that the ECB does not react to money growth.\textsuperscript{16} Two considerations may explain why money growth is significant in this and the study by Carstensen. First, in both cases the same period only includes data from the ECB period. Clearly, it is difficult to conduct any inference on what the Governing Council reacts to by using data from the period before the ECB was established. Second, both studies use monthly, rather than quarterly. While using monthly data triples the number of observations, which increases the precision of the estimates, it also increases the amount of noise, which reduces precision. It may be that in this case the former effect dominates. Third, both studies use probit methods, which are inherently non-linear. Since it is plausible that the Governing Council’s reactions to money growth depend also on the strength of inflation pressures and on economic sentiment, these models may do a better job in detecting policy responses to money growth.

\textsuperscript{15} The “Taylor principle” holds if the long-run impact on the level of interest rates of a one percentage point increase in inflation implied a regression of the level of the interest rate on its past value(s), inflation and the output gap is larger than unity.

\textsuperscript{16} References
One reaction to the significance of money growth is that it may be due to reverse causality. Changes in interest rates impact on the opportunity cost of holding money and therefore on money growth. Indeed, this is a major reason why it is difficult to interpret movements in money growth. The argument that the estimates are affected by reverse causality, however, implies that money growth should have a negative, not positive, sign in the model since a higher repo rate reduces money growth.17

4.5 Alternative estimates: real economic activity

The results above raise the question whether other measures of economic activity are better able to account for changes of the repo rate. Furthermore, will decomposing headline inflation into core inflation and changes in energy and unprocessed food prices, or using expected inflation, lead to better estimates? Rather than considering all possible variations of the different measures of economic activity and inflation, I proceed sequentially by first considering alternative measures of activity before considering other concepts of inflation.

In the second column in Table 4 reports results from estimation of the ordered probit model in column 1 using a three-month moving average of the growth rate of industrial production over twelve months. The model in column 3 uses instead the EuroCOIN index and that in column 4 expected real GDP for the coming twelve months constructed from data tabulated in The Economist. While the different measures of economic activity are significant in all cases, which is evidence that the Governing Council responds strongly to changes in the outlook for growth, the pseudo r-squareds indicate that the fit is worse than when sentiment is used. This reduction in fit explains why the significance of the other variables declines sharply. For instance, when industrial production is used, no other variable is significant. From this I conclude that economic sentiment play an import role in determining (or, at least, is strongly correlated with) the Governing Council’s view of economic conditions.

17 Interestingly, Ullrich (2003) reports a significant negative coefficient on money growth in reaction functions estimated on euro area data from January 1999 to August 2002.
4.6 Alternative estimates: inflation

As noted above, core inflation appears prominently in the Editorials, as does movements in prices of unprocessed food and energy. This raises the question whether the Governing Council responds equally strongly to these inflation indicators, in which headline inflation is the appropriate variable to include in the models. To explore this issue note that, by definition, headline inflation, $\pi$, can be written as a weighted average of core inflation, $\pi^c$, the rate of change of energy prices, $\pi^e$, and the rate of change of unprocessed food prices, $\pi^f$:

$$\pi = 0.842 \times \pi^c + 0.081 \times \pi^e + 0.077 \times \pi^f.$$ 

The first column of Table 5 reports again the estimates using headline inflation. In the second column, headline inflation is decomposed into the three components (that is, $0.842 \times \pi^c$, $0.081 \times \pi^e$ and $0.077 \times \pi^f$). If the Governing Council reacts equally to these, the parameters estimates on these measures of inflation should be close to the 1.24 parameter estimate for headline inflation in the first column and the hypothesis that they are identical should not be rejected. While that hypothesis is not rejected ($p = 0.36$) and the parameters on core inflation and the rate of change of energy prices are significant at the ten percent level, unprocessed food prices are highly insignificant.

Reestimating the model without the rate of change of unprocessed food prices yields the results in column 3. These show that core inflation and the rate of change of energy prices are now somewhat more significant, but not materially so. Since the hypothesis that the parameters are identical ($p = 0.56$) is not rejected, I reestimate the model under this restriction. The results, in column 4, are quite similar to those reported for headline inflation in column 1 but the inflation measure is marginally more significant. Overall, this suggests that while it is possible to find measures of inflation that are more significant than headline inflation in the ordered probit equations, they do not enhance the fit of the model materially.

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18 Since the sum of the weights of the two components is less than unity, I multiply the data by $1/(0.842+0.081)$ so that the estimated parameters are comparable to those estimated earlier.
Estimating the model using the measure of expected inflation constructed using the data in the Economist yields the results in column 5. The pseudo $r$-squared now falls substantially and expected inflation in insignificant. The main conclusion is thus that headline inflation does as good of a job as any other inflation measure in accounting for changes in interest rates.

4.7 Money growth

As noted above, the ratio of the parameters indicate the relative importance of the two variables in influencing the probabilities. Since the parameter on headline inflation is about 1.2 and that on money growth about 0.9 (see the column 1 in Table 5), a one percentage point change in money growth has three quarters of the impact on the estimated probabilities of a one percentage point change in inflation.\(^{19}\)

To get a better sense of the role of money growth in the ECB’s interest rate setting, it is useful to calculate the probabilities of alternative policy changes as a function of the money growth rate. With five possible outcomes (-0.50%, -0.25%, 0, +0.25% and +0.50%), there are five different probabilities to calculate. Since the probabilities sum to unity, it is sufficient to plot four of them. Figure 9 show these as a function of money growth. Before considering the results it is important to recall that the probabilities depend on all variables, and not only on money growth. To construct the plots, values for inflation, the repo rate, and sentiment must be assumed. Since the result below serve as benchmarks for the subsequent analysis, it is natural to assume that all variables are at their unconditional sample means and that there was no change in the repo rate last month.\(^{20}\)

The estimated probabilities of a policy change are minimised at the average money growth rate in the sample, which was just above 6%. Faster money growth rates raise the probability of a 0.25% increase in the repo rate relatively quickly. As increasingly higher money growth rates are considered, the probability of a 0.50% increase in repo rates rises rapidly and the probability of a 0.25% increase starts to decline. This

\(^{19}\) A test of the hypothesis that the parameters are equal yields $p = 0.62$.

\(^{20}\) The sample means are: inflation, 2.0%; repo rate, 3.2%; and sentiment, 0.3%.
illustrates, as discussed above, the fact that the impact of the regressors of the probabilities of the “intermediate” outcomes is ambiguous.

The main finding in Figure 9 is that money growth rates below ten percent do not much impact on the likelihood of a tightening of monetary policy. This finding hinges on the assumption that the variables are at their sample means, which, of course, makes a change in monetary policy unlikely. It is therefore of interest to study the impact of money growth on interest rate decisions in an environment in which a policy change is more likely. To do so, it is necessary to first make assumptions regarding inflation, sentiment and the repo rate. For the calculations to be informative, it is important that the scenarios considered are plausible given the observed relationships between the variables. Letting \( s \) denote sentiment, as a first step I obtain \( E(\pi | s) \) and \( E(i | s) \) by least-squares projection. I can then make assumptions regarding sentiment and use the implied values for inflation and the repo rate in the simulations.

Figure 10 contains a plot of the estimated probability of a 0.25% increase in interest rates for different rates of money growth. The probabilities are constructed under the assumption that sentiment is one standard deviation above its mean, or 8.5%, given which the most likely values for the repo rate and inflation are 3.6% and 1.9%, which are assumed. For comparison purposes, the figure also contains the benchmark probabilities plotted in Figure 9. The figure shows that the assumption of stronger sentiment shifts the probability-response curve to the left. For instance, while the probability of a small increase in the repo rate when money is growing by 6% is negligible when all variables are at their means, it is around 40% when sentiment is one standard deviation above its mean. Figure 11 contains the analogue curves for the case of a large increase in the repo rate. In this case the impact of a rise in sentiment by one standard deviation perhaps even more striking. While the probability of large tightening of monetary policy is essentially zero when the money growth rate is 7% and sentiment is at its mean, that probability is about 50% when sentiment is one standard deviation stronger.

The main conclusion of this analysis is that it appears that under “ordinary” conditions when changes in monetary policy are unlikely, money growth has little impact on the probability of a policy change. When conditions are weaker or stronger, however, the role of money growth in interest-rate setting is much greater.
5. Conclusions

The main conclusions of the analysis above are as follows.

First, measures of economic sentiment or confidence appear to play an important role in the ECB’s policy decisions. They are frequently referred to in the Governing Council’s discussion of the economy in the Editorials of the Monthly Bulletins and are statistically more significant than several other potential measures of real economic activity in the estimated reaction functions. The use of sentiment as a policy indicator seems sensible in light of the fact that it is strongly correlated with future output gaps and expectations of future real GDP growth. Furthermore, because of the publication lags, the Governing Council uses real GDP data largely to assess how reasonable its past judgement of economic activity were. Output gaps thus appear to play no role in its thinking about the current state of the economy.

Second, interest rate changes are more closely tied to economic activity than to inflation and money growth. The reason for this seems to be that the Governing Council has interpreted movements in inflation to be largely temporary and thus as having little implication for future inflation. This has been the case even in situations in which inflation has exceeded the 2% level that constitutes the upper limit of the ECB’s definition of price stability. This interpretation is supported by the fact that that expected inflation has been below, but close to, 2% in the period studied.21

Third, the “Taylor principle” appears satisfied in the sense that the (point) estimates suggest that the repo rate has to rise by more than one percentage point in order for an one percentage point rise in inflation to have no impact on the probability of an interest rate change.

Fourth, the Governing Council reacts to M3 growth. The extent to which it does so, however, depends (as in all probit models) on sentiment, inflation, the level of the repo rate and the rate of money growth. In “good” times when inflation, sentiment and the repo rate are at a normal level, the probability of a policy change is not very

21 It should be recalled that expected inflation depends the shocks that hit the economy and the public’s perception of the ECB’s ability to offset their impact on inflation.
sensitive to money growth. In times in which there are greater risks of inflation, money growth has a much larger impact on the probability of interest rate changes.
References


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Table 2
Changes in repo rate
January 1999 – June 2004
(66 Observations)

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Subtotal 8 7 Total: 15
Table 3
Ordered probit models
February 1999 – June 2004
(65 Observations)

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Note: p-values in brackets [    ].
### Table 4
Ordered probit models
February 1999 – June 2004
(65 Observations)

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Note: p-values in brackets [ ].
Table 5
Ordered probit models
February 1999 – June 2004
(65 Observations)

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Note: p-values in brackets [    ].
Figure 1
Sentiment and Output Gaps
(Quarterly data; Normalised)

Figure 2
Cross-Correlations of Sentiment and Output Gaps
(Quarterly data; 95% Confidence Band)
Figure 3
Alternative Inflation Measures 1

Figure 4
Alternative Inflation Measures 2

Figure 5
Alternative Measures of Real Economic Activity

Figure 6
Alternative Measures of Real Economic Activity

Figure 7
Alternative Measures of Money Growth

Figure 8
Repo Rate
Figure 9
Probability of policy changes
(Variables evaluated at mean of sentiment)

Figure 10
Probability of 0.25% interest rate increase
(Variables evaluated conditional on sentiment)

Figure 11
Probability of 0.50% interest rate increase
(Variables evaluated conditional on sentiment)