INTERNATIONAL TRADE FINANCE AND THE COST CHANNEL OF MONETARY POLICY IN OPEN ECONOMIES

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Abstract

This paper models the interaction between international trade finance and monetary policy in open economies and shows that trade finance affects the propagation mechanism of all macroeconomic shocks that are identified to be drivers of business cycles in advanced economies. Bayesian estimation results show that trade finance conditions, which in turn are driven by US interest rates, are critical in explaining economic fluctuations. Quantitatively, trade finance has a larger impact on spillover effects of shocks to foreign countries, implying that incorporation of trade finance is particularly important when modeling small open economies.

Keywords: Trade Finance, monetary policy, DSGE.

JEL Classification: F44; F41; E44; E52

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1 Introduction

While the literature on trade finance is extensive,\textsuperscript{1} the implications of trade finance for business cycles—in particular its link to monetary policy and its role in transmitting business cycle fluctuations across countries—have not been studied to date. This omission is surprising given the fact that standard open economy models commonly used in academia and by central banks and policy institutions typically give a central role to international trade, which is the primary and in some cases the only channel through which shocks can be transmitted across countries in these models.

This paper addresses this void by studying business cycle implications of trade finance through the lens of a calibrated and an estimated two-country New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. Trade finance is modeled by augmenting the cost channel of monetary policy, and is consistent with a variety of different trade finance arrangements that have been identified in the trade literature, including direct lending by banks to the exporter and/or the importer, inter-firm trade credit, trading on open account (i.e post delivery payment) and cash in advance.\textsuperscript{2} While the cost channel has been studied extensively both in closed and open economy settings, this is the first paper to model the distinction between international and intra-national trade vis-à-vis the cost channel in a theoretical setting, a feature which has extensive empirical support in the trade literature.

The main theoretical contribution of the paper is to highlight how trade finance can have different implications on the effects of the same shock depending on how external sectors in the two countries are oriented, and to

\textsuperscript{1}Bekaert et al. (2009) identify trade finance as the “fundamental problem in international trade”. According to the estimates of the Committee on the Global Financial System, $6.5–8 trillion worth of bank-intermediated trade finance was provided during the year 2011, which, at around 10 percent of global GDP and 30 percent of global trade, is a fairly sizable number in itself, even though it does not include letters of credit and other forms of trade finance not explicitly involving bank loans.

\textsuperscript{2}See Ahn et al. (2011), Antràs and Foley (2014) and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013).
what extend they differ across countries. External sectors, or sectors in an
economy which interact directly with the rest of the world through exports and
imports, can differ across countries in several dimensions including the degree
of passthrough (or price stickiness), time lags associated with transactions and
the degree of intermediation involved as well as the interest rate they face when
accessing financial markets for working capital loans.\(^3\)

As an illustration of the main mechanism, consider the role played by trade
finance in the transmission of monetary policy shocks in a model in which
external sectors in the two countries are perfectly symmetric except potentially
with respect to the degree of price stickiness. With high interest rates, the cost
of imports increases in both countries. If price stickiness is symmetric across
countries, then this affects import prices symmetrically, leading to a switch
towards domestically produced goods in both countries. While this leads to
a sharp fall in trade, the effect on GDP is minimal, since the loss in demand
for imports in compensated by the rise coming from domestic consumers who
face an increase in import prices. If on the other hand price stickiness is not
symmetric across countries, then expenditure switching in one country is not
offset by the other, and trade finance begins to significantly affect not only
trade volumes and prices but also GDP.

Taking the US and Eurozone as the two countries, the model is estimated
with Bayesian techniques using data on several macroeconomic time series
including GDP, inflation and bilateral trade. Key findings from this empirical
exercise can be summarized as follows. Firstly, based on formal model com-
parison exercises, models incorporating trade finance are found to significantly
outperform models which ignore this feature. Secondly, US monetary policy and
interest rates are found to be the key determinant of trade finance conditions.
Thirdly, import retail prices in the US are found to be more flexible than in
the Eurozone, a distinction which, as argued above, has first-order implications
for the importance of trade finance in affecting transmission of business cycle
shocks. Fourthly, trade finance is found to have a larger impact on spillover

\(^3\)All these could more primitively be linked to heterogeneity in export and import bundles
across countries, although these heterogeneities are not explicitly modeled in the paper.
effects of shocks to the foreign country compared to its effect on the country of origin of the shock.

2 Model

The model in this paper builds on the framework used in Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2006), which in turn fit into the New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) paradigm of Obstfeld et al. (1996). The world economy is assumed to consist of two countries of equal size. Households have preferences over domestic and foreign goods and supply labor to firms elastically. There are two sets of firms in each economy—production firms and trade firms. Prices are assumed to be sticky and consequently money is not neutral in the short run. The monetary authority is assumed to conduct monetary policy by using the short-term nominal interest rate as its instrument. The following sections describe each of the sectors in the model in detail. For brevity, only the home economy is described in detail. The foreign economy is assumed to be isomorphic.

Households

The household side of the economy is characterized by a representative consumer with preferences over consumption and leisure given by the following utility function.

\[ U(C_h, H_h, N_h) = \frac{1}{1 - \sigma_c} \left( \frac{C_h - H_h}{A_t} \right)^{1 - \sigma_c} - \frac{1}{1 + \sigma_L} N_h^{1+\sigma_L} \]  

Here \( C_h \) is consumption, \( N_h \) is the labor supply and \( H_h (= \chi C_{h-1}) \) is the habit stock going into period \( t \). \( A_t \) is a non-stationary world-wide productivity shock.

\footnote{See \cite{Lane2001} for a survey of the NOEM literature.}
which evolves according to:

$$A_t = Z_t (\gamma A_{t-1})$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.2)

Here $Z_t$ is an exogenous component and $\gamma$ denotes the trend growth rate of world productivity. Agents are thus assumed to derive utility from effective consumption relative to the level of global technology.\(^5\) Preferences are characterized by internal habits.

I assume a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator for $C^h_t$:

$$C^h_t = \left[ (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} (C^{hh}_t)^{\frac{\eta - 1}{\eta}} + \alpha^{\frac{1}{\eta}} (C^{fh}_t)^{\frac{\eta - 1}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta - 1}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.3)

Here $C^{hh}_t$ and $C^{fh}_t$ denote the home and foreign produced components in the consumption bundle of country $h$. $\eta$ is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign aggregates and $\alpha$ parametrizes the home bias in consumption. The associated price index, which is also the consumer price index (CPI) of the home country is given by

$$P^{h,cpi}_t = \left[ (1 - \alpha) (P^{hh}_t)^{1-\eta} + \alpha (P^{fh}_t)^{1-\eta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.4)

where $P^{hh}_t$ and $P^{fh}_t$ denote the domestic and import price indices for the home country. The bundles $C^{hh}_t$ and $C^{fh}_t$ in turn are CES aggregates combining different home and foreign produced varieties,

$$C^{hh}_t = \left[ \int_j C^{hh}_t(j)^{\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon}} \, dj \right]^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}}, C^{fh}_t = \left[ \int_j C^{fh}_t(j)^{\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon}} \, dj \right]^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.5)

where $\epsilon$ is the elasticity of substitution across different varieties produced in the same country.

The associated price indices are as follows:

\(^5\)This assumption is made to ensure that the model has a balanced growth path along which hours worked are stationary as is the case in the data.
Here $P_{hh}^{th}(i)$ and $P_{fh}^{th}(j)$ denote the prices paid by home consumers for imported varieties $i$ and $j$ respectively. Markets are assumed to be complete, so that households can trade in a complete set of state-contingent securities in order to smooth consumption fluctuations. While the complete markets assumption is a strong one, it is used extensively in the literature and incomplete markets have been shown to generate only minor departures from the complete markets benchmark (see for instance Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2003.)

In the presence of complete markets the household budget constraint is as follows:

$$P_{h,c}^{th} C_{h}^{th} + \hat{s} \mu_{t,t+1}^{\mu}(s) D_{t+1}^{h}(s) \leq W_{t}^{h} N_{t}^{h} + D_{t}^{h} + T_{t}^{h}$$

Here $D_{t+1}$ denotes the amount of state-contingent securities purchased by households at price $\mu_{t,t+1}(s)$ which yield one unit of nominal payoff at time $t + 1$ if state $s$ is realized. $W_{t}$ is the nominal wage, and $T_{t}$ denotes lump sum transfers to households. These include net transfers from the government as well as dividends from firms and financial intermediaries. Each of these components will be described in detail in the following sections.

Although as a simplification I model a cashless economy with no explicit mention of money, implicitly there is assumed to be a time invariant one to one relationship between the nominal interest interest rate and money demand which the central bank can exploit to set the desired nominal interest rate by changing the money supply.

The first-order conditions characterizing the household problem are as follows:

$$A_{t}^{th} = \left( \frac{(C_{t}^{h} - H_{t}^{h})}{A_{t}} \right)^{-\sigma_{c}} - \chi \gamma \beta E_{t} \left[ \frac{A_{t}}{A_{t+1}} \left( \frac{(C_{t+1}^{h} - H_{t+1}^{h})}{A_{t+1}} \right)^{-\sigma_{c}} \right]$$

(2.8)
\begin{equation}
(N_t^h)^{c_L} = \lambda_t^h \frac{W_t^h}{P_t^{h,cpi}}
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
\beta E_t \left[ \frac{\lambda_{t+1}^h P_{t+1}^{h,cpi}}{\lambda_t^h P_t^{h,cpi}} \right] = \frac{1}{R^h_t} = \mu_{t,t+1}
\end{equation}

\(\lambda_t^h\) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint, which also captures the marginal utility of consumption. Equation (2.8) is the standard Euler equation with internal habits in consumption. (2.9) is the labor supply condition which equates the marginal disutility from work to the increase in income. (2.10) Gives the price of state-contingent bonds, which also equals the inverse of the equilibrium gross nominal interest rate. Note that (2.10) uses the assumption that the state-contingent bonds are denominated in the home currency. This is without loss of generality and the corresponding equation for the foreign country is given by

\begin{equation}
\beta E_t \left[ \frac{\lambda_{t+1}^f P_{t+1}^{f,cpi}}{\lambda_t^f P_t^{f,cpi}} \frac{E_t}{E_{t+1}} \right] = \frac{1}{R_{t}^f} = \mu_{t,t+1}
\end{equation}

where \(E_t\) denotes the nominal interest rate, i.e. the price of foreign currency in terms of home currency.\(^6\) (2.10) and (2.11) can be used to show that uncovered interest rate parity condition holds up to a first-order.

\begin{equation}
R_t^h = R_{t}^f \mathbb{E}_t \left( \frac{E_{t+1}}{E_t} \right)
\end{equation}

**Firms**

The production side of the economy is characterized by a continuum of atomistic firms, each of which produces a differentiated product. Labor is the only input in production and the production function of the generic firm is given by:

\(^6\)Note that as defined here, an increase in the nominal exchange rate corresponds to a depreciation of the home currency.
\[ Y_t^h(j) = A_t A_t^h N_t^h(j) \quad (2.13) \]

Here \( A_t \) is a common worldwide technology component and \( A_t^h \) is a country-specific stationary technology shock. Following Christiano et al. (2005) I assume that firms operate under a working capital constraint and are required to borrow funds at the nominal interest rate to pay a fraction of their wage bill. The cost function of the firm is thus given by:

\[ \Xi_t^h(j) = R_{t}^h W_t^h Y_t^h(j) \quad (2.14) \]

where \( R_{t}^h \) is the firm’s total interest rate factor. I assume that a fraction \( u^h_L \) of the wage bill has to be financed by intra-period borrowing, which gives the following relationship defining the external financial dependence of goods-producing firms:

\[ R_{t}^h = \left( u^h_L R_t^h + 1 - u^h_L \right) \quad (2.15) \]

\( u^h_L = 0 \) corresponds to the case with no working capital constraints whereas \( u^h_L = 1 \) corresponds to the case that is considered in most papers that model the cost channel, including Christiano et al. (2005) and Ravenna and Walsh (2006). Goods-producing firms are constrained to borrow at the domestic interest rate (i.e., they cannot borrow in foreign currency).

The market structure is assumed to be monopolistically competitive. Each producer producing a distinct good faces an elasticity of demand \( \epsilon \). Prices are assumed to be sticky and pricing contracts are staggered according to the mechanism in Calvo (1983).

In each period each firm has the opportunity to re-optimize and set its price with probability \( (1 - \theta_h) \). The firms that do not optimize their price are assumed to keep their price unchanged from the previous period. Conditional on having the opportunity to reset its price in period \( t \), firm \( j \) would reset its price in order to maximize a discounted value of its lifetime future expected profits conditional on the prices remaining the same. The associated maximization problem is given by:
\[ P^h_t(j)^* = \text{Argmax}_t \left[ \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\theta^h)^k \Omega_{t,t+k} \left[ P^h_t(j)^* Y^h_t(j) - \Xi^h_{t+k}(j) \right] \right] \]  
(2.16)

where the demand function for each firm is as follows:

\[ Y^h_t(j) = \left( \frac{P^h_t(j)^*}{P^h_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon} Y^h_t \]  
(2.17)

This leads to the following forward-looking Phillips curve for PPI inflation:\textsuperscript{7}

\[ \pi^h_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \pi^h_{t+1} + \frac{(1 - \beta\theta^h)(1 - \theta^h)}{\theta^h} m^h_t \]  
(2.18)

**Import-Export Sector**

In order to introduce a role for trade finance, an import-export sector characterized by the presence of trade firms is explicitly introduced, as in Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) and Monacelli (2005). While these papers introduce the import sector purely to generate the scope for incomplete passthrough of exchange rate fluctuations into import prices, the international trade sector in this model, which is assumed to be credit-constrained, generates a role for trade finance constraints to influence real variables in the economy in addition to incomplete passthrough. In particular, like the domestic firms, the trade firms too are assumed to be credit-constrained and are required to borrow to pay for an exogenous (and time invariant) fraction of their costs. For simplicity, I assume that the trade firms do not employ any labor.

Sequential trade and vertical fragmentation are key features in the trade data that have been successful in explaining many empirical stylized facts.\textsuperscript{8} Following this literature I model the import sector as characterized by a sequence of firms that operate at different stages. Each firm has a trivial production function which transforms the input into output one for one. Each

\textsuperscript{7}The derivation is standard, see for instance Galí (2009).

\textsuperscript{8}See for instance Wong and Eng (2012), Huang and Liu (2001) and Huang and Liu (2007)
firm, however, is credit-constrained and is required to finance a part of its purchase by borrowing at the risk-free rate. Multiple processing stages in the import sector thus play the role of amplifying the cost effects of monetary policy.

Incorporating these features, the import-export sector is modeled as a sequence of firms in \( n \) stages. At each stage \( k \), a continuum of atomistic firms operate with the following production technology:

\[
Y_{k,t}(j) = Y_{k-1,t}(j), \quad k \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}, j \in (0, 1) \quad (2.19)
\]

Note that for simplicity it is assumed that these firms neither employ labor nor are they subject to productivity shocks as is the case with goods-producing firms. The cost function of each firm is given by:

\[
\Xi_{k,t}(j) = R_{k,t}^{fh} P_{k-1,t}^{fh} \quad (2.20)
\]

where, similar to the goods-producing firms, \( R_{k,t}^{fh} \) is the gross interest factor which characterizes the external finance dependence of the sector. Moreover, in order to allow for incomplete passthrough of exchange rate into import prices, firms at the final stage \( (n) \) in the import-export sector are assumed to operate under monopolistic competition like the goods-producing firms. Under these assumptions, the real marginal cost of the import-export sector as a whole can be written as follows:

\[
\Phi_{t}^{fh} = E_t R_{t}^{fh} P_{t}^{fh} \quad (2.21)
\]

Here \( P_{t}^{fh} \) denotes the local currency price of foreign goods that are sold to home consumers. Note that similar to Lubik and Schorfheide (2006), this real marginal cost term can be interpreted as a law of one price gap. However, in this paper this gap comprises not only of incomplete passthrough because of price stickiness but also an additional effect coming from trade finance, which implies that in this model there can be deviations from law of one price even in the absence of market power and flexible prices on the part of the importing
firms.

The gross interest rate factor in equation 2.21 can be written as follows:

\[ R^{fh}_{t} = \left[ u^{fh} R^{c}_{t} + (1 - u^{fh}) \right]^{n} \]  

(2.22)

where \( n \) is the number of processing stages and \( 0 < u^{fh} < 1 \) is the fraction of the purchases that have to be financed by external borrowing at each stage. \( R^{c}_{t} \) is the interest rate that is used in trade finance. It would be either the home interest rate \( (R^{f}_{t}) \) or the foreign interest rate \( R^{f}_{t} \).

Log linearizing equation (2.22) yields the following approximate relationship between the number of processing stages, external finance dependence in each stage and the nominal interest rate

\[ r^{fh}_{t} \approx n u^{fh} r^{h}_{t} \]  

(2.23)

As is evident from (2.23), the impact of changes in nominal interest rates on trade finance depends on both the external finance dependence \( (u^{fh}) \) and the number of processing stages \( (n) \). The equation also makes it clear, however that with this specification it is not possible to identify these two parameters separately in the data. Moreover, the relationship between the risk free interest rate and the marginal cost of the retail sector may depend on other factors that are not modeled explicitly but may nevertheless play a role.\(^9\) Since the goal of the paper is to study the consequences of this relationship rather than its micro-foundations, the model is parametrized in terms of an aggregate parameter \((\delta^{fh})\) which can be understood as the elasticity of marginal cost of import retailers with respect to the risk free rate, i.e

\[ r^{fh}_{t} = \delta^{fh} r^{h}_{t} \]  

(2.24)

where \( \delta^{fh} = f(n, u^{fh}, Z) \) is a function of \( n, u^{fh} \) and other characteristics \( Z \) that are not explicitly modeled.

Trade finance in the real world (both domestic and international) is opera-

\(^9\)Amplification effects coming via a financial accelerator type mechanism is an example of one such scenario.
tionalized in a number of different ways including direct lending by banks to the exporter and/or the importer, inter-firm trade credit, open account (i.e. post delivery payment) or cash-in advance.\textsuperscript{10} To the extent that all these mechanisms involve at least one of the parties engaging in borrowing at an interest rate that is directly affected by changes in monetary policy (as captured by equation 2.24), it is important to emphasize that even with this parsimonious specification of external finance dependence, the model is general enough to capture all the different trade finance arrangements.

Similar to the case of goods-producing firms, the optimal pricing decisions of the importing firms lead to the following forward-looking Phillips curve for import consumer prices.

\begin{equation}
\pi_{t}^{fh} = \beta E_{t} \pi_{t+1}^{fh} + \frac{(1 - \beta \theta^{fh})(1 - \theta^{fh})}{\theta^{fh}} \phi_{t}^{fh}
\end{equation}

As $\theta^{fh} \to 0$ we have the benchmark case of complete passthrough, with the difference from the standard model being that in addition to exchange rate rate pass through, there is also “interest rate passthrough”, a novel channel not considered in the literature so far.

The CPI inflation in the home country is given by a weighted sum of $\pi_{t}^{fh}$ and $\pi_{t}^{h}$. In particular,

\begin{equation}
\pi_{t}^{fh} = (1 - \alpha) \pi_{t}^{h} + \alpha \pi_{t}^{fh}
\end{equation}

\textbf{Financial Intermediaries}

As emphasized above, a key feature in this model is that firms are liquidity-constrained. In particular, they are constrained to finance (partly or fully) their input purchases (or wages as the case may be) by borrowing at the risk free rate. This financing could be assumed to be intermediated by banks, which rebate their profits to domestic households.\textsuperscript{11}


\textsuperscript{11}This forms part of the term $T_{t}^{h}$ in equation 2.7 along with other dividend payments from goods-producing and trade firms
Government

The remaining aspects of the model are standard. There is a government which finances current expenditure by imposing lump sum taxes on households. For simplicity, government borrowing or lending is not allowed, and all expenditures are financed based on current period receipts.\footnote{With optimizing households, Ricardian equivalence holds and allowing for government borrowing will not alter the results.}

The government consumption good is assumed to follow the same aggregator as that for the households. The overall government spending process is stochastic and driven by persistent shocks.

\[
g^h_t = \rho^g g^h_{t-1} + \epsilon^h_{gt} \tag{2.27}
\]

Note that although neither the lump sum tax nor the assumption of same consumption bundle for households and the government is realistic,\footnote{In particular, government consumption is likely to be concentrated towards non-tradable and therefore exhibit a higher home bias than households. See Lane (2010) for a discussion of this point.} the goal for introducing the government in this model is to have a source for exogenous demand shocks. The paper is not aimed at studying the effects of fiscal policy per se.

Central Bank

The central bank is assumed to set interest rates according to a modified version of the Taylor rule postulated in Taylor (1993).

\[
i^h_t = \rho^R i^h_{t-1} + (1 - \rho^R) \left[ \phi^h \pi^h_t + \phi^h y^h_t + \phi^h e^h_t \right] + \epsilon^h_{rt} \tag{2.28}
\]

where \(i^h_t\) denotes the nominal interest rate \((R^h_t = 1 + i^h_t)\), \(\Delta \pi^h_t\) denotes the growth rate of output and \(\Delta e^h_t\) denotes the rate of (nominal) depreciation. \(\epsilon^h_{rt}\) is an idiosyncratic white noise process to be interpreted as a monetary policy shock.
Finally, the model is closed by imposing the following market clearing condition for each firm in equilibrium:

$$ Y_t^h(j) = C_t^{hh}(j) + G_t^{hh}(j) + C_t^{hf}(j) + C_t^{hf}(j) \forall j \in (0, 1) \tag{2.29} $$

**Terms of Trade and Real Exchange Rate**

Terms of trade for a country is defined as the ratio of the price of domestically produced good at home relative to the price of imported goods. In particular, the terms of trade for the home country is defined as follows:

$$ \text{tot}_t^h = \frac{P_t^h}{P_t^{fh}} \tag{2.30} $$

Analogously, terms of trade for the foreign country is defined as:

$$ \text{tot}_t^f = \frac{P_t^f}{P_t^{hf}} \tag{2.31} $$

Using (2.21) and its foreign country counterpart along with (2.30) and (2.31) give:

$$ \phi_t^{fh} \phi_t^{hf} = \text{tot}_t^h \text{tot}_t^f R_t^{fh} R_t^{hf} \tag{2.32} $$

This equation shows that even under the assumption of perfect competition (so that $\phi_t^{hf} = \phi_t^{fh} = 1$) the home and foreign terms of trade do not equal each other (inversely). In this case, the law of one price gap still exists, but depends only on terms relating to international trade finance.

The real exchange rate (RER) between home and foreign currencies is defined in the standard way by weighting the nominal exchange rate by the ratio of the consumer price indices in the two countries.

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14 Note that typically terms of trade is defined as the ratio of the price of exports to imports. The distinction ceases to matter since most models typically have the feature that export prices are equal to domestic prices. This, however, is not the case in this model due to imperfect competition as well as trade finance.
Equilibrium and Solution method

The equilibrium conditions characterized above along with the shock processes comprise a dynamic system with a unique non-stochastic steady state. The model is solved by log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions characterizing the model around this non-stochastic steady state. In addition to the monetary policy, productivity and government spending shocks, the model also features a shock to the labor supply equation and the nominal exchange rate process.

3 Calibration and Assessment of the Role of External Finance

This section discusses some simulation results based on a symmetrically calibrated version of the model to outline the dynamics of the key model variables and how they are affected by the presence and degree of external finance dependence in the wake of exogenous shocks. The model is calibrated to a symmetric two-country case with most parameter values picked from the previous literature— in particular Lubik and Schorfheide (2006), Smets and Wouters (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2007), but the values are kept the same for both home and foreign countries so as to illustrate the mechanics in the model more clearly. \(^{15}\)

Table 3 shows the values used in the calibration exercise. Although most

\[^{15}\text{These restrictions will be lifted in the empirical section and most parameters will be estimated without imposing these symmetry restrictions.}\]
of the values are standard, there are a few parameters that merit further discussion. The intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is a parameter that, despite extensive empirical research, has failed to yield a consensus, leading to the “Elasticity Puzzle” (see Ruhl, 2008). While calibrated models typically rely on evidence from the trade literature and pick values greater than one, estimates based on macro data typically yield much lower values, most often less than one. Although this paper too finds estimates of elasticity to be small in line with the macro literature, these estimates could be susceptible to the downward aggregation bias discussed in Imbs and Méjean (2012), who show that when elasticities are heterogenous, aggregation leads to a downward bias. Indeed the evidence on heterogeneity of elasticities is substantial, as documented in Patel et al. (2014) and Broda and Weinstein (2006) among others. The value chosen for the simulation results $\eta = 1$ is a compromise between the estimated obtained from the micro and macro literatures and is more in line with the latter.

The only asymmetries introduced in the calibration are in the external sectors in the two countries in order to study their interaction with trade finance constraints. The external sectors of the two countries can be asymmetric along several dimensions. Firstly, they could differ in the degree of their external finance dependence, i.e $\delta^{fh} \neq \delta^{hf}$. As argued above, this implies that the asymmetry is either in the average external finance dependence per stage and/or the number of stages involved in transporting the good from one country to another. For instance, Amiti and Weinstein (2011) find that external finance dependence is much higher for goods shipped by sea compared to those shipped by air. Secondly, countries could differ in the degree of their import price passthroughs, which could be a function of the nature of goods themselves. For instance, Peneva (2009) shows that prices of labor intensive goods are stickier than capital-intensive goods. If countries export goods with substantially different factor intensities, this could lead to an asymmetry in

import prices. Lastly, countries can also differ in the interest rate/currency that
ey are constrained to borrow in. The first two asymmetries are likely to be
linked to differences in export bundles of countries. A country exporting high
end luxury products is likely to have lower competition, higher markups and
hence lower price flexibility in its prices compared to a commodity-exporting
country that exports a homogenous product. The third source of asymmetry,
the currency denomination of debt, is likely to be an institutional feature
that I assume is fixed in the short run. The two parameters governing import
price stickiness will be varied in the simulations to show how they affect the
propagation mechanism of shocks. In order to determine plausible values for
the external finance dependence parameters, I rely on two different approaches.
Firstly, I consider the model’s prediction regarding the fall in trade to GDP
ratios in response to a trade finance shock, which in the context of this paper is
best understood as a shock to the interest rate spread. Table 1 shows the peak
response of trade to GDP ratio. The corresponding number in the data is of
the order of 20 to 30 percent. Eaton et al. (2011) argue that about 80 percent
of the fall in trade to GDP ratio can be accounted for by demand side effects
and heterogeneity in traded vs non-traded goods. This leaves 20 percent of the
collapse, or about 4-6 percent fall in trade to GDP ratios unexplained. Table 1
shows the peak response of trade to GDP ratio under different assumption on
elasticity of substitution and import price flexibility. Since there is no consensus
on the value of elasticity of substitution (although values closer to and even
below 1 are typically preferred by the macro data), a value of $\delta$ around 2 seems
to be a plausible (if somewhat conservative) value for this parameter.\(^{18}\)

As discussed above, the parameter $\delta$ captures not just external financial
dependence of sectors but rather also the number of stages involved in the
process from actual production to eventual consumption. Regarding this
interpretation, one can get a sense of the length of the chain by considering
a statistic like the average propagation length (APL). The APL between A

\(^{18}\)The maximum response it generates is -10 percent which seems a bit high, but neither
this elasticity nor this passthrough specification seems plausible and is rejected by the data.
Based on the other three numbers, it seems to be a conservative estimate.
Table 1 – Peak Response of trade to GDP ratio to an interest rate spread shock of 300 basis points

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\eta = 2$</th>
<th>$\delta = 2$</th>
<th>$\delta = 4$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^{bf} = \theta^{bf} = 0.1$</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
<td>-23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^{bf} = \theta^{bf} = 0.7$</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\eta = 0.5$</th>
<th>$\delta = 2$</th>
<th>$\delta = 4$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^{bf} = \theta^{bf} = 0.1$</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^{bf} = \theta^{bf} = 0.7$</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 – Average Propagation Length: Summary Statistics For Benchmark Year 2007

(a) Average Propagation Length (APL) Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Level APL</th>
<th>Country-Sector Level APL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of countries</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean APL</td>
<td>2.8465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median APL</td>
<td>2.7396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Dev</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) APL for select Country Pairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>3.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Input Output Database (wiod.org) and author calculations.
**Table 3 – Parameter Calibration for Simulation Exercises**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^h$</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^f$</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^{hf}$</td>
<td>${0.1,0.7}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^{fh}$</td>
<td>${0.1,0.7}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_c$</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_L$</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_{x}$</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_{y}$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_{e}$</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_R$</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>${0,2}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and B measures the number of stages it takes for the good produced in A to reach B. As an example, consider a world in which global trade comprises of an upstream country (say Japan) exporting intermediate goods to a downstream country (say China) which in turn exports them to the consuming country (say the US). In this simple example, the APL between Japan and the US would be 2, which the APL between Japan and China would be 1.

More generally, APLs can be computed using input-output tables using the procedure outlined in Dietzenbacher and Romero (2007). Table 2 displays summary statistics for APLs computed at the country and country-sector level using detailed inter-country input output data from the World Input Output Database for the benchmark year 2007. While the country level APLs are likely to be biased downwards since they ignore within country flows and the heterogeneity is substantial, the values in the range 2 to 5 seem to be a reasonable based on these statistics, which are also in line with the range of plausible values obtained using the behavior of trade to GDP ratios.

---

19See Timmer and Erumban (2012) for a detailed description of the database and Dietzenbacher and Romero (2007) for a detailed discussion of APL.
4 Model Simulations

Monetary Shocks

Figure 4.1 plots impulse responses of nine endogenous variables to a contractionary home monetary policy shock in the symmetric case where both home and foreign import price exhibit high flexibility ($\theta_{hf} = \theta_{fh} = 0.1$). The three lines correspond to models without trade finance, the model in which all trade finance is driven by home interest rates and a model in which all trade finance is driven by foreign interest rates respectively. As the figure shows, as far as foreign GDP is concerned, in all these three cases the expenditure switching effect dominates the aggregate demand effect and a monetary contraction leads to an increase in foreign GDP. As is also evident from the diagrams, the net effect of trade finance constraints on home and foreign GDP is minimal. This is a consequence of two opposing effects which tend to cancel each other out in this symmetric setting. Since global interest rates are high, the external finance channel makes imports more expensive for both countries, leading to a shift towards domestically produced goods by both home and foreign consumers. The two sides of this shift imply that in a symmetric setting the fall in demand for imports is compensated by the rise in demand for domestically produced goods, implying a negligible net effect on both home and foreign GDP. The impulse responses of terms of trade for both home and foreign countries as well as the global trade to GDP ratio show that although the net effect on GDP is negligible, the movements in terms of trade indicate a substantial decline in global trade, since in the case with trade finance constraints on trade the effect on both home and foreign terms of trade is lower, signaling the rise in competitiveness of domestically produced goods and fall in competitiveness of imports in both the home and foreign markets.

There are at least three implications captured in these results. Firstly, note that although GDP is not significantly affected by trade finance in this case, the model with trade finance constraints does imply a larger fall in
Figure 4.1 – Home Monetary Contraction: $\theta^{fh} = \theta^{hf} = 0.1$

Notes: The impulse responses are computed through simulations using the values in table 3. The horizontal axis measures time in quarters. The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path. Inflation and nominal interest rate are given in annualized percentage points. The other variables are in percentages.
Figure 4.2 – Home Monetary Contraction: $\theta^{fh} = \theta^{hf} = 0.1$

Notes: The impulse responses are computed through simulations using the values in table 3. The horizontal axis measures time in quarters. The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path. Inflation and nominal interest rate are given in annualized percentage points. The other variables are in percentages.
global trade, and hence points towards lower welfare for both domestic and foreign agents.\textsuperscript{20} Secondly, this analysis shows that the model with trade finance constraints has the potential to explain phenomena like the Great Trade Collapse which characterized the great recession and the subsequent recovery\textsuperscript{21}, at least qualitatively, since the model with trade finance constraints leads to a much sharper fall in trade to GDP ratio compared to the model without trade finance constraints. Although monetary policy may not have been the primary cause of the increase in financing costs (and may have in fact mitigated their rise), financial intermediation, and in particular trade finance did take a big hit in the aftermath of the great recession for many different reasons including increase in uncertainty. Although this paper models financing costs solely as captured by changes in the risk free interest rate, changes in trade finance premia for other reasons are likely to generate the same effects. Thirdly, these pictures emphasize the difference and provide a comparison between the real exchange rate and terms of trade and measures of competitiveness. The real exchange rate (RER) in its many forms is typically used as a measure of competitiveness. However, when the law of one price does not hold—as is the case in this model—competitiveness in the home and foreign markets become de-linked from one another and a single measure like the RER becomes insufficient to quantify competitiveness movements. Terms of trade, separately defined for the two countries to account for the disparity in prices, are the right quantities to examine in order to make inferences regarding competitiveness. This also allows for the possibility of simultaneous increase and/or decrease in competitiveness in the two countries, something that an RER measure by construction cannot accommodate.

Figures A.1 and A.2 in the appendix show impulse responses to the same endogenous variables and the same shock as above but for the case in which both home and foreign import prices have lower passthrough ($\theta^hf = \theta^fh = 0.7$). In this case the aggregate demand effect dominates the expenditure switching

\textsuperscript{20}The model is analytically intractable and the simulation results are based on a first-order approximation and a full quantitative characterization of the welfare is beyond the scope of the paper.

\textsuperscript{21}See for instance Bems et al. (2010)
effect and foreign GDP falls in response to a home monetary contraction. With regard to trade finance constraints, however, the message from this picture is the same as above, i.e. with symmetric passthrough trade finance constraints imply a large drop in international trade (and terms of trade) but have a minimal net effect on both home and foreign GDP. The results are similar if trade is assumed to be financed by borrowing at the foreign risk free rate instead of home, although the magnitude of the effect is less.

The main conclusion that emerges from the analysis so far is that when the external sectors of the two countries are symmetric (with regard to their passthrough as well as external finance dependence), the presence of trade finance constraints affects the response of trade and terms of trade variables but has minimal impact on the GDP of two countries. The remainder of this section will show that if the external sectors of the two countries are asymmetric, then trade finance constraints alter not just the response of trade variables, but also the responses of home and foreign GDP to various shocks.

Figure 4.3 shows how the domestic and spillover effects of contractionary monetary policy at home are altered in the presence of trade finance requirements in the case in which home import prices are more flexible than foreign import prices. As a starting point, the dotted line (without trade finance constraints) shows that this parameter specification implies that the expenditure switching effect dominates the aggregate demand effect and the net effect of the shock is to cause an increase in foreign output accompanied by a fall in domestic output.\(^\text{22}\)

Comparing the impulse responses with and without trade finance constraints also serves to show that trade finance constraints tend to generate a positive effect on home GDP and a negative effect on foreign GDP. This is due to the fact that trade finance constraints coupled with a higher interest rates imply that imports become more expensive. Since home import prices are more flexible, this effect is felt more in the form of a shift towards home-produced goods by home consumers, whereas the low passthrough to foreign import prices that the consumers end up paying implies that the corresponding shift in the foreign country is minimal. Together these two effects

\(^{22}\)i.e, with this parameters specification monetary expansions are “beggar thy neighbor”
**Figure 4.3 – Home Monetary Contraction: $\theta^{fh} = 0.1, \theta^{hk} = 0.7$**

Notes: The impulse responses are computed through simulations using the values in table 3. The horizontal axis measures time in quarters. The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path. Inflation and nominal interest rate are given in annualized percentage points. The other variables are in percentages.
lead to a lower fall in the demand for goods produced at home compared to the case in which trade is not dependent on external finance. The remaining plots in figure 4.3 illustrate how the transmission mechanism is altered in the presence of trade finance constraints. As argued above, the key relative price governing the allocation of expenditure between domestically produced goods and imports in this model is the terms of trade, which is defined as the ratio of the price of domestically produced goods to the price of imports. As seen in figure 4.3 the home terms of trade increases by less in the presence of trade finance constraints. This is due to the interest rate component which enters the denominator of terms of trade (via the import price) and tends to reduce the expenditure switching towards foreign produced goods. Foreign terms of trade, which show lower impact because of high price stickiness in foreign imports, exhibit the same pattern qualitatively. In standard open economy models, the real exchange rate is the quantity that determines the relative expenditure shares across home and imported goods and serves as a measure of competitiveness. However, as the impulse responses of the real exchange rate in figure 4.3 show, this is not the case in the present model. With trade finance, the real exchange rate appreciates more, which in the absence of the interest rate channel would imply a larger spillover effect.

Figure 4.4 presents the other case of asymmetric passthrough in which foreign import prices are highly flexible while domestic import prices are sticky. In this case the trade finance constraints generate a negative impact on home GDP and a positive impact on foreign GDP. The intuition is the same as above. Once again the higher interest rates translate into higher import prices as before, but now the impact on foreign import prices is much higher due to greater price flexibility in that sector. As a result, demand for home exports decline to a greater extent leading to a greater fall in home GDP and a higher rise in foreign GDP. Figure 4.4 also shows the differences in transmission mechanism across the different models as manifested in the terms of trade, which experience much larger movements in the presence of trade finance constraints in this case.

As emphasized above, import price flexibility (or passthrough) is not the only dimension along which the external sectors of the two countries can
Figure 4.4 – Home Monetary Contraction: $\theta^{fh} = 0.7, \theta^{hf} = 0.1$

(a) Home GDP  
(b) Foreign GDP  
(c) Home Nominal Interest  
(d) Foreign Nominal Interest  
(e) Home TOT  
(f) Foreign TOT  
(g) Trade GDP  
(h) Real Exchange Rate  
(i) Nominal Exchange Rate

Notes: The impulse responses are computed through simulations using the values in table 3. The horizontal axis measures time in quarters. The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path. Inflation and nominal interest rate are given in annualized percentage points. The other variables are in percentages.
differ. So far it was assumed that within each model there is only one interest rate (i.e. the risk free rate of one of the two countries) that governs external finance cost for all trade firms. A priori there is no reason to believe that this would necessarily be the case. Because of institutional constraints or other frictions, trade firms may be constrained to borrow only in the risk free rate of a particular country. As two extreme cases, we may have a scenario in which all bilateral trade finance is governed by either the exporter’s risk free interest rate or the importer’s risk free rate. In comparison to figure 4.1, figure 4.2 shows that if this is the case, then even if passthrough is symmetric in both countries, trade finance constraints can alter the response of GDP to monetary shocks. Consider for instance the impulse responses of home and foreign GDP in figure 4.2. The baseline case (without trade finance constraints) is represented by the dotted line. If trade finance is governed by the exporting country’s monetary policy (blue/dashed lines), then the figure shows that trade finance constraints generate a negative impact on home GDP and a positive impact on foreign GDP. The intuition is as follows: as a result of the home monetary shock, home interest rate rises significantly more than foreign interest rate. This affects trade flows from home to foreign country more than from foreign to home country, since the latter set of trade flows are dependent on the foreign interest rates. As a result, the demand for home goods from abroad falls sharply, with little countervailing increase coming from domestic demand since foreign interest rates rise only moderately. The net effect is a sharper fall in home GDP and a reduced spillover effect on foreign GDP. The scenario reverses itself when trade finance is governed by the importing country’s nominal interest rate (green/solid line). Now the trade finance constraints generate a positive impact on home GDP and a negative effect on foreign GDP. More generally, trade finance in either direction could be governed by a combination of home and foreign interest rates. This possibility will also be considered in the estimation section.

There is potentially a third source of asymmetry vis-à-vis the external

\footnote{Which also rises in this case, but may actually fall for different calibration of parameters as seen in figure A.2.}
Table 4 – Summary of Transmission of Monetary Policy with Trade Finance Constraints and Asymmetric Passthrough

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\theta^{fh}$</th>
<th>$\theta^{hf}$</th>
<th>Home GDP</th>
<th>Foreign GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Symmetric</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric Passthrough</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Asymmetric Interest rate dependence for trade finance

- Exporter interest rate trade finance: ↓ ↑
- Importer interest rate trade finance: ↑ ↓

sectors of the two countries as they could differ in their external finance dependence parameters themselves (i.e $\delta^{hf} \neq \delta^{hf}$). The mechanics in this scenario will be much like the ones discussed above for the exporter vs importer trade finance scenarios.

Table 4 summarizes the impact of trade finance constraints on the transmission of home monetary contraction to home and foreign GDP. When home import prices are more flexible than foreign import prices, trade finance constraints tend to increase home GDP at the expense of foreign GDP. The opposite happens when foreign import prices are more flexible than home import prices.
Labor hiring costs: A comparison with the closed economy cost channel

External finance dependence of goods-producing firms (in the form of labor financing) is another channel through which monetary policy generates a cost-push effect in this model.\(^{24}\) Figure 4.5 displays the impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock at home in which both home and foreign import passthrough is high ($\theta^h F = \theta^f F = 0.1$). The top row shows that the effect on GDP is minimal, much like the case with symmetric passthrough and trade finance constraints. However, unlike the latter, in this case the difference in the response of terms of trade and trade to GDP ratios across the two models is also minimal, indicating that there is little effect of these constraints on international trade as well. This confirms the results obtained in closed economy settings by Gilchrist (2002) and Kaufmann and Scharler (2009), that the cost side effects of monetary policy-as captured by labor financing constraints-have little quantitative impact over and above the aggregate demand effects of monetary policy.

Figure 4.6 further shows that the response of GDP to a monetary contraction continues to be minimal even under asymmetric passthrough. The results are similar to the ones reported above and the main conclusion that emerges from this exercise is that labor financing constraints, which is the primary means through which cost side effects of monetary policy have been introduced in the literature so far, are not quantitatively important.

Effects of External Finance Constraints on Propagation of Non-Monetary Shocks

The main theoretical contribution of this paper is the incorporation of cost side effects of interest rates through trade and labor finance constraints. While the impact of these features shows up most clearly in the case of propagation

\(^{24}\)In fact this is the only channel through which cost side effects of monetary policy are modeled in closed economy settings-see for instance Ravenna and Walsh (2006)
Figure 4.5 – Home Monetary Contraction with labor cost: $\theta^h = \theta^f = 0.1$

Notes: The impulse responses are computed through simulations using the values in table 3. The horizontal axis measures time in quarters. The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path. Inflation and nominal interest rate are given in annualized percentage points. The other variables are in percentages.
Figure 4.6 – Home Monetary Contraction with labor cost: $\theta^{fh} = 0.1, \theta^{hf} = 0.7$

Notes: The impulse responses are computed through simulations using the values in table 3. The horizontal axis measures time in quarters. The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path. Inflation and nominal interest rate are given in annualized percentage points. The other variables are in percentages.
of monetary policy shocks, they also affect the propagation mechanism of all other shocks in the economy via their effects on global interest rates through the endogenous component of monetary policy represented by the interest rate rule. For instance, following a positive aggregate demand shock the central bank is likely to respond by raising interest rates. In the model with financial constraints, this change would trigger cost side effects that are absent in the standard model and that can significantly alter the transmission mechanism of the original demand shock in both the home and the foreign economy. This Appendix A illustrates some such effects for two non-monetary shocks in the model—a supply shock (rise in home productivity) and a demand shock (rise in home government spending).

5 Estimation Set Up

Data

The model is matched to the data by treating the US and the Eurozone as the two countries comprising the world economy. The sample period is 1983Q1-2007Q4. The period from 2007 onwards has been characterized by abnormally low interest rates with US interest rates stuck at zero and the European interest rates exhibiting a wide divergence across countries. Since the focus of the paper is to capture variations in cost of external finance as captured by interest rates, the period since the financial crisis is not suited for the study for both the reasons mentioned above.

Table 5 lists the variables used as observables in the estimation (A more detailed description along with data sources can be found in appendix H). These comprise short-term nominal interest rates, the euro-dollar nominal exchange rate, GDP growth rates and various inflation rates for the two countries, as
well as the change in bilateral trade to GDP ratio. Compared to previous studies like Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) that have used only one measure of prices (namely the CPI inflation) The US data is taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the European data is taken from the European Central Bank’s Area Wide Model (AWM) database. Bilateral Trade data comes from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (Database). The DOTS covers only merchandise trade which in the absence of more comprehensive data will be used as a proxy for aggregate trade.\footnote{Since DOTS does not explicitly have the Eurozone imports from the US, I take the difference between European Union imports and imports by Britain.} Prior to estimation, all the data is seasonally adjusted and demeaned.

**Shocks**

All estimated models allow for a minimum of 10 shocks. These include government spending shocks, idiosyncratic (country-specific) productivity shocks, labor supply shocks and monetary policy shocks for each country, as well as a global productivity shock and a shock to the nominal exchange rate depreciation rate. Moreover, since import and export prices are particularly vulnerable to miscalculation,\footnote{see for instance Nakamura and Steinsson (2009)} I explicitly introduce measurement errors in this variable whenever it is included in the estimation exercise. Another reason to introduce measurement error in this equation is evident from 2.26, which shows that there is a linear relationship between three observables and hence stochastic singularity would arise in the absence of such a measurement error.
**Table 5 – Observables and Data Sources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Rates</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$R^{US}$</td>
<td>Effective Federal Funds Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^{EU}$</td>
<td>EURO Area nominal interest rate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prices</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\pi^{US,CPI}$</td>
<td>CPI inflation, US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi^{US,GDP}$</td>
<td>GDP deflator Inflation. US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi^{EU,CPI}$</td>
<td>CPI inflation, EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi^{EU,GDP}$</td>
<td>GDP deflator Inflation. EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi^{US,IMP}$</td>
<td>Import price inflation, US</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exchange Rate</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$% \Delta E$</td>
<td>Nominal Depreciation rate of UD dollar against EURO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta Y^{US}$</td>
<td>GDP growth Rate, US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta Y^{EU}$</td>
<td>GDP growth Rate, EU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \left( \frac{\text{Trade}}{\text{GDP}} \right)$</td>
<td>Change in Trade/GDP ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \left( \frac{\text{Import}}{\text{GDP}} \right)$</td>
<td>Change in Imports/GDP ratio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Priors

The first four columns of table 6 list the priors used in the estimation prices. Most of the priors are based on priors and estimates from Lubik and Schorfheide (2006), Smets and Wouters (2007) and Smets and Wouters (2003). There are two parameters that quantify trade finance dependence which are new in the paper ($\delta_{hf}$ and $\delta_{fh}$). Regarding $\delta_{hf}$ and $\delta_{fh}$, no off-the-shelf parameter estimates are available as reliable benchmarks. Relaying on the observations from calibration results a value of 2 is used as the mean for the prior. A fairly high standard deviation is allowed in the prior in order to reflect parameter uncertainty. Regarding the elasticity of substitution ($\eta$), a prior of 1 is assumed as a compromise between the macro and micro evidence regarding the magnitude of this parameter as argued before.

6 Estimation Results

Parameter Estimates and Model Comparison

Tables 6 summarizes the prior and posterior distribution of the estimated parameters for the model in which all trade is financed by borrowing at the US interest rate. This is the model which has the highest Bayes factor, as will be discussed later.

It is pertinent to note that the posterior estimates of the price stickiness parameters imply that the data supports a model in which there is asymmetry in the passthrough into import prices across the two countries. While the passthrough into EU import prices is quite low ($\theta_{EU\text{ Import}}$ has a posterior mean of 0.87), the corresponding value for the US is fairly high (posterior mean of $\theta_{US\text{ Import}}$ is 0.38). The obvious candidate behind this discrepancy seems
### Table 6 – Summary of Prior and Posterior Distribution of Estimated Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Prior Distribution</th>
<th>Prior Mean</th>
<th>Prior Stdev</th>
<th>Posterior Mean</th>
<th>90% C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^{US}$</td>
<td>Calvo Domestic</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.837</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^{US}$ Import</td>
<td>Calvo Import</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td>0.229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^{EU}$ Import</td>
<td>Calvo Import</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td>0.726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^{EU}$</td>
<td>Calvo Domestic</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_c$</td>
<td>Intertemporal Consumption Elasticity</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>4.512</td>
<td>3.309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_L$</td>
<td>Labor supply Elasticity</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.541</td>
<td>0.966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$h$</td>
<td>Habit Parameter</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td>0.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>Intra Temporal Elasticity</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.408</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi^{US}_s$</td>
<td>Taylor Rule Parameter</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.926</td>
<td>1.591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi^{US}_y$</td>
<td>Taylor Rule Parameter</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>0.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi^{US}_e$</td>
<td>Taylor Rule Parameter</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi^{EU}_s$</td>
<td>Taylor Rule Parameter</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.862</td>
<td>1.524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi^{EU}_y$</td>
<td>Taylor Rule Parameter</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi^{EU}_e$</td>
<td>Taylor Rule Parameter</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho^{US}_T$</td>
<td>US TFP Persistence</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>0.992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho^{US}_R$</td>
<td>US Interest rate Smoothing</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td>0.789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho^{US}_G$</td>
<td>US Government spending Persistence</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>0.941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho^{EU}_T$</td>
<td>EU TFP Persistence</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>0.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho^{EU}_R$</td>
<td>EU Interest rate Smoothing</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.867</td>
<td>0.843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho^{EU}_G$</td>
<td>EU Government spending Persistence</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.891</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\rho_Z$</td>
<td>Global Productivity Persistence</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.461</td>
<td>0.258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta^{EU \rightarrow US}$</td>
<td>Trade Finance Parameter: US</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>0.991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta^{US \rightarrow EU}$</td>
<td>Trade Finance Parameter: US</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.837</td>
<td>0.735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho^{US}_N$</td>
<td>US Labor Supply Shock persistence</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho^{EU}_N$</td>
<td>EU Labor Supply Shock persistence</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.894</td>
<td>0.849</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The results are based on 200,000 MCMC draws (split across 2 chains) after burn in with the posterior mode used as the starting value for each parameter.
Table 7 – Comparison of Calvo Parameters with Lubik and Schorfheide (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Posterior Mean</th>
<th>Posterior Mean</th>
<th>90 percent C.I</th>
<th>Prior Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_{US}$</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>[0.49, 0.77]</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_{US\text{ Import}}$</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>[0.17, 0.72]</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_{EU\text{ Import}}$</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>[0.82, 1.00]</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_{EU}$</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>[0.43, 0.81]</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

to be the US import price index. Since import prices are known to be highly volatile, and since the estimation uses import prices for only the US, it is likely to lead to high passthrough estimates (low price stickiness parameters). This, however, is not the case, since the passthrough estimates do not change much even if the US import price inflation is removed from the list of observables used in the estimation, which is the case in the reported results.\footnote{Even when it is included, the estimation procedure explicitly allows for measurement error in this variable in order to account for the extremely high volatility of this variable compared to other prices used in the estimation.}

These results are in line with estimates from Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) who also find evidence in favor of this asymmetry. Table 7 shows a comparison of the posterior means for the Calvo parameters from table 6. In their case this difference may also be driven by the choice of their prior distribution, which is asymmetric and implies higher price flexibility in the US compared to EU for both domestic and import prices.\footnote{They rely on Bils and Klenow (2004) and Angeloni et al. (2006) to impose a high prior on Europe and low prior on the US.} This paper on the other hand does not impose this asymmetry ex ante.

Table 8 reports the log marginal density for various specifications of the model that are estimated, along with the Bayes factor for each model in comparison to the model without trade finance. Assuming the prior to be the same across models, numbers in each column (i.e. estimates based on the same number of observables) can be interpreted as measures of the posterior

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lcccc}
\hline
\textbf{Parameter} & \textbf{Posterior Mean} & \textbf{Posterior Mean} & \textbf{90 percent C.I} & \textbf{Prior Mean} \\
\hline
$\theta_{US}$ & 0.83 & 0.62 & [0.49, 0.77] & 0.5 \\
$\theta_{US\text{ Import}}$ & 0.38 & 0.45 & [0.17, 0.72] & 0.5 \\
$\theta_{EU\text{ Import}}$ & 0.87 & 0.9 & [0.82, 1.00] & 0.75 \\
$\theta_{EU}$ & 0.75 & 0.61 & [0.43, 0.81] & 0.75 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Comparison of Calvo Parameters with Lubik and Schorfheide (2006)}
\end{table}
Table 8 – Marginal Likelihood for different models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Marginal data density</th>
<th>Bayes Factor (wrt No trade finance)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No trade finance</td>
<td>-1236.04</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trade finance: both Interest rates</td>
<td>-1233.71</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US interest rate trade finance</strong></td>
<td>-1227.37</td>
<td>5825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU interest rate trade finance</td>
<td>-1236.15</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Importer Interest rate trade finance</strong></td>
<td>-1227.42</td>
<td>5541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exporter interest rate trade finance</td>
<td>-1232.34</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The second model “trade finance: both Interest rates” allows for trade finance to be dependent on both home and foreign interest rates odds ratios, with higher numbers (i.e. lower absolute values) indicating higher posterior odds for the corresponding model.\(^{29}\) The last column report Bayes factors computed with respect to the baseline model with no trade finance (which by construction has a Bayes factor of 1 with respect to itself.). Bayes factors greater than one indicate that the respective model is more preferred by the data than the baseline model. According to Jeffreys (1998), any Bayes factor greater than 30 is “very strong” and a Bayes factor greater than 20 is “decisive” evidence.

As can be seen from the first row, the models with trade financing with US interest rates and importer interest rates carry the highest posterior probability and Bayes factors. The first of these is not surprising, given the central role that US monetary policy plays in the global economy and given the fact that the dollar is also the primary vehicle currency in which international trade is

\(^{29}\)Note that this comparison is valid as long as the prior is proper, which is the case throughout this paper.
conducted.\textsuperscript{30} The higher posterior marginal data density of the model with importer interest rate trade finance is interesting. Although the majority of the empirical literature in trade finance has documented the link between exporter monetary policy and volume of exports, theoretical justifications given for these apply equally to the link between imports and interest rates as well. The question of which channel (or both) is more important is an empirical question that calls for more research and this paper provides indicative evidence that the link between imports and external finance conditions in importing countries could be an important aspect affecting business cycle fluctuations. In the data, the trade finance channel seems to be governed by the interaction of US interest rates with US imports. Since European imports play a limited role due to their low price flexibility, the models with US interest rate and importer interest rate financing both seem to be consistent and the data is not clearly able to distinguish between the two.\textsuperscript{31}

\textbf{Comparison of Shock Propagation Mechanism Across Estimated Versions of the Model}

This section illustrates the differences in propagation mechanisms using estimated impulse responses for two shocks. Figure 6.1 shows the impulse response of a one standard deviation US monetary contraction (median and 90 percent confidence bands) using the estimated model with trade finance constraints and US trade finance (the model with the higher posterior probability than the standard model). For comparison, the figure also shows two impulse responses corresponding to the standard model. One of these (labelled “Estimated w/o trade finance (Median)” ) corresponds to the estimated model

\textsuperscript{30}For evidence regarding the latter, see Goldberg and Tille (2008).

\textsuperscript{31}The parameter estimates are also quite similar across the two models. Table 9 in the appendix summarizes the parameter estimates for the latter model.
without trade finance constraints and the second (labelled “Simulated w/o trade finance”) corresponds to the impulse response from the simulated model with all parameters at the posterior mean from the model with trade finance constraints except the trade finance dependence parameters themselves which are set to zero. These are two alternative ways of comparing the results with the estimated model with trade finance. Qualitatively, the results in figure 6.1 are broadly in line with the simulation results. Quantitatively, the figure shows that while the models generate similar predictions for the response of domestic GDP, they differ appreciably in the response of foreign GDP and terms of trade. This is also true in figure 6.2 which compares the estimated impulse responses to a monetary contraction with the model with importer trade finance taken as the benchmark.

Figures G.1 and G.2 in appendix G display a similar exercise with two non-monetary shocks—a one standard deviation labor supply shock and a one standard deviation productivity shock respectively. Once again, the results are qualitatively in agreement with the simulation results. The productivity shock, which has a high persistence (the autoregressive coefficient being 0.99) provides an opportunity to illustrate that since in line with evidence form the empirical literature trade finance is modeled in a way such that it has minimal impact at low frequencies, it is unlikely to make much difference in terms of the response of variables to persistent shocks, as is found to be the case in figure G.2.

These results convey that trade finance constraints have a larger impact in altering the spillover effects of domestic shocks as opposed to the domestic effects themselves. One implication of this is that, for a large open economy like the US whose business cycle fluctuations are mostly driven by domestic shocks, excluding trade finance from models might be an innocuous omission. On the other hand, if the object of interest is to study spillover effects from foreign shocks (as would typically be the case for a small open economy), ignoring trade finance constraints can lead to severe misrepresentation of the important transmission channels in the model. The intuitive underpinning for this comes from the fact that trade finance exerts its influence on shock propagation by affecting terms of trade which translate into changes in trade volumes. As
Figure 6.1 – US Monetary Contraction

(a) Home GDP

(b) Foreign GDP

(c) Home Nominal Interest

(d) Foreign Nominal Interest

(e) Home TOT

(f) RER

(g) US Inflation

Note: Baseline model (dotted line) assumes US interest rate trade finance.
Figure 6.2 - US Monetary Contraction

Note: Baseline model (dotted line) assumes importer country trade finance.
far as the domestic economy is concerned, it is therefore just an additional channel through which the main effects are likely to come from the domestic impact of shocks in variables only weakly related to international trade. On the other hand, as far as the foreign economy and spillover effects are concerned, the entire effect of the domestic shock is transmitted through the external sector, which in turn is affected by trade finance constraints. As a result, the incorporation of trade finance constraints matters more for spillover effects of shocks as opposed to domestic effects. Section F in the appendix considers some robustness which serve to show that the results reported in this section are fairly robust to alternate priors and model characteristics.

7 Conclusion

This paper assesses how international trade finance affects business cycle fluctuations in open economies by modeling the link between trade finance and the cost channel of monetary policy in a two-country New Keynesian DSGE model. Unlike the domestic component of the cost channel of monetary policy, which has been studied extensively in the literature, this paper shows that the cost channel when combined with trade finance has much richer implications for business cycles, both qualitatively and quantitatively. More specifically, it shows that when external sectors are symmetric across countries with respect to their sensitivity to trade finance conditions, trade finance constraints lead to sharp movements in terms of trade and trade volumes, but do not significantly alter the response of GDP to shocks in either country. But if external sectors are asymmetric, trade finance constraints significantly alter the response of GDP to both monetary and non-monetary shocks. Various sources of this asymmetry (including differences in import price flexibility) are identified and their implications are explored.

Bayesian techniques are used to estimate a two-country DSGE model with
trade finance using data from the US and the Eurozone (EZ), two regions which share one of the largest bilateral trade relationships in the world. Based on formal model comparison exercises, models that appropriately incorporate trade finance constraints are found to provide a better characterization of the data and trade finance is established to be quantitatively important even after accounting for parameter uncertainty. Moreover, trade finance is found to have a larger impact on spillover effects of shocks rather than the effects on the country of origin. The intuition for this is as follows: Because of home bias in consumption, the domestic sector in a country is typically larger than the external sector. When a shock originates in the domestic sector, its primary impact is through the direct impact that it has on the domestic sector. For instance, in the case of a monetary contraction, the primary impact comes from a rise in the risk free rate, which alters the consumption-saving decision of households and leads to a fall in aggregate demand and prices. If the economy is open, there is an additional effect of the shock which comes from the external sector (in the case of a monetary contraction, this would be a fall in demand due to an appreciation of the exchange rate). However, since the external sector is small, the second effect is small as far as the domestic economy is concerned. This is no longer true for the spillover effects of the shock to other countries. These spillover effects are transmitted exclusively through the external sectors of the two countries, so if trade finance can influence the dynamics of these external sectors, it can make large alterations to the spillover effects. This makes the incorporation of trade finance constraints especially important for understanding business cycles in small open economies and countries that face a sizable fraction of their fluctuations due to shocks originating beyond their borders. On the other hand, omission of trade finance in modeling a large open economy like the US may indeed be innocuous.

The parameter estimates across models provide compelling evidence for asymmetry in import price flexibility across these two countries. In particular, US import prices are found to be more flexible than their European counterparts. In line with the theoretical results discussed in the paper, this distinction implies that trade finance matters not only for trade volumes and terms of trade, but
also for variables like GDP and inflation. This is the first paper to consider the implications for heterogeneity in import price flexibility across countries and estimate the relevant parameters. While the estimates are somewhat in agreement with Lubik and Schorfheide (2006), who also estimate analogous parameters, they seem to be at odds with the extensive literature which has found passthrough (in particular with regards to the nominal exchange rate) into US import prices to be low, pointing to a very low import price flexibility for the US.\textsuperscript{32} Although a thorough exploration of this apparent discrepancy requires detailed examination of micro data and is beyond the scope of this paper, two possible explanations can be conjectured. Firstly, while the trade literature for the most part has focussed exclusively on nominal exchange rate passthrough, the asymmetry revealed here is with regard to passthrough of marginal costs into prices more generally, including other components of marginal costs apart from the nominal exchange rate. Secondly, while the trade literature has focussed on import prices at the dock, the estimates in the model correspond to the retail price of imports. Understanding the journey of imports from the dock to eventual retail outlets, including the characteristics of the different markets and intermediaries involved would be an important part of interpreting these findings.

Models incorporating the financial accelerator have become prominent in the DSGE literature, especially since the financial crisis. In order to isolate the role of trade finance in the simplest possible setting, this paper abstracted from the interaction between firm value and external finance premia. Endogenizing the external finance premium, in particular its variation across time while maintaining the international vs intra-national trade distinction would be an extension worth pursuing in future research.

Lastly, the approach in this paper is primarily positive and is focused on analyzing the role of trade finance constraints in affecting the propagation mechanism of shocks. Given the strong evidence in favor of models incorporating trade finance, normative aspects of trade finance also seem worthy of consideration. Most important amongst these is likely to be a characterization

\textsuperscript{32}See for instance Gopinath et al. (2010)
of optimal monetary policy in models incorporating trade finance constraints. Although Ravenna and Walsh (2006) characterize the optimal monetary policy problem in the presence of the cost channel, they do so in a closed economy setting. As emphasized above, the more important cost side effects are likely to come from international trade finance constraints and their incorporation into an optimal monetary policy problem is likely to be a fruitful avenue for future research, especially for economies that face a larger fraction of their fluctuations from foreign shocks.

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50
Appendix

A Simulated Impulse Responses

A.1 Monetary Shocks

See figures A.1-A.4.

A.2 Non-Monetary Shocks

Government Spending Shock

Figure A.5 shows the impulse response to a home government spending shock in the symmetric case for three models that differ in their trade finance setup as indicated, and under three different scenarios of import price flexibility as described above. The results are in line with those reported in table 4.

Productivity Shocks

Positive productivity shocks present the opposite scenario to the one operational in the case of monetary contractions and positive aggregate demand shocks since with the interest rule modeled in the paper they typically lead to a fall in interest rates following a positive shock. Figures A.6 through A.11 illustrate the impulse responses of different variables in the model to a positive home productivity shock under different model assumptions as before.

The results are in line with those reported above (and summarized in table 4), but operational in reverse, so that when home import prices are more flexible
Figure A.1 – Home Monetary Contraction: $\theta^{fh} = 0.7, \theta^{hf} = 0.7$

(a) Home GDP
(b) Foreign GDP
(c) Home Nominal Interest
(d) Foreign Nominal Interest
(e) Home TOT
(f) Foreign TOT
(g) $\left( \frac{\text{Trade}}{\text{GDP}} \right)$
(h) Real Exchange Rate
(i) Nominal Exchange Rate

Notes: The impulse responses are computed through simulations using the values in table 3. The horizontal axis measures time in quarters. The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path. Inflation and nominal interest rate are given in annualized percentage points. The other variables are in percentages.
Figure A.2 – Home Monetary Contraction: $\theta^h = 0.7, \theta^{hf} = 0.7$

(a) Home GDP  
(b) Foreign GDP  
(c) Home Nominal Interest  
(d) Foreign Nominal Interest  
(e) Home TOT  
(f) Foreign TOT  
(g) Trade GDP  
(h) Real Exchange Rate  
(i) Nominal Exchange Rate

Notes: The impulse responses are computed through simulations using the values in table 3. The horizontal axis measures time in quarters. The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path. Inflation and nominal interest rate are given in annualized percentage points. The other variables are in percentages.
Figure A.3 – Home Monetary Contraction: $\theta^h = 0.1, \theta^{hf} = 0.7$

Notes: The impulse responses are computed through simulations using the values in table 3. The horizontal axis measures time in quarters. The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path. Inflation and nominal interest rate are given in annualized percentage points. The other variables are in percentages.
Figure A.4 – Home Monetary Contraction: $\theta^h = 0.7, \theta^{hf} = 0.1$

Notes: The impulse responses are computed through simulations using the values in table 3. The horizontal axis measures time in quarters. The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path. Inflation and nominal interest rate are given in annualized percentage points. The other variables are in percentages.
Figure A.5 – Home Government Spending Shock

\[ \theta^{fh} = 0.1, \theta^{hf} = 0.7 \]

(a) Home GDP

(b) Foreign GDP

(c) Home Nominal Interest

\[ \theta^{fh} = 0.7, \theta^{hf} = 0.1 \]

(d) Home GDP

(e) Foreign GDP

(f) Home Nominal Interest

\[ \theta^{fh} = 0.7, \theta^{hf} = 0.7 \]

(g) Home GDP

(h) Foreign GDP

(i) Home Nominal Interest

Legend:

- Red: Baseline (No TF)
- Dotted: Home TF
- Green: Foreign TF
Figure A.6 – Home Productivity Shock: $\theta^{fh} = 0.1, \theta^{hf} = 0.7$

Notes: The impulse responses are computed through simulations using the values in table 3. The horizontal axis measures time in quarters. The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path. Inflation and nominal interest rate are given in annualized percentage points. The other variables are in percentages.
Figure A.7 – Home Productivity Shock: $\theta^{fh} = 0.1, \theta^{hf} = 0.7$

(a) Home GDP

(b) Foreign GDP

(c) Home Nominal Interest

(d) Foreign Nominal Interest

(e) Home TOT

(f) Foreign TOT

(g) (Trade GDP)

(h) Real Exchange Rate

(i) Nominal Exchange Rate

Notes: The impulse responses are computed through simulations using the values in table 3. The horizontal axis measures time in quarters. The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path. Inflation and nominal interest rate are given in annualized percentage points. The other variables are in percentages.
than their foreign counterpart, trade finance constraints end up increasing the demand for foreign goods compared to the model without trade finance constraints. (see figure A.6).

**B Application: Expansionary Monetary Contractions**

Expansionary monetary contractions (or equivalently contractionary devaluations) are phenomena that standard macro models are unable to account for, especially for advanced economies. Although, liability dollarization can explain this puzzle for developing economies (see for instance (Cook, 2004)), these explanations cannot explain the evidence in favor of expansionary monetary contractions in the US based on certain identified vector auto-regressions like those in Uhlig (2005). The trade finance mechanism proposed in this paper can in principle account for this result if the external finance dependence in relatively high. Figure B.1 displays the impulse responses to a home monetary contraction with asymmetric passthrough ($\theta^{hf} = 0.9, \theta^{fh} = 0.1$) and varying degrees of external finance dependence when the elasticity of substitution is 2. It shows that in this case when $\delta$ is high enough, home output actually expands following a monetary contraction. The reason is that although the exchange rate appreciates, because of the heavy reliance of imports on external finance import prices increase to such an extent that demand for home output ands up increasing, even though aggregate demand by home agent falls.
Figure A.8 - Home Productivity Shock: $\theta^{fh} = 0.7, \theta^{hf} = 0.1$

Notes: The impulse responses are computed through simulations using the values in table 3. The horizontal axis measures time in quarters. The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path. Inflation and nominal interest rate are given in annualized percentage points. The other variables are in percentages.
Figure A.9 – Home Productivity Shock: $\theta^{fh} = 0.7, \theta^{hf} = 0.1$

(a) Home GDP
(b) Foreign GDP
(c) Home Nominal Interest
(d) Foreign Nominal Interest
(e) Home TOT
(f) Foreign TOT
(g) $\frac{\text{Trade GDP}}{\text{GDP}}$
(h) Real Exchange Rate
(i) Nominal Exchange Rate

Notes: The impulse responses are computed through simulations using the values in table 3. The horizontal axis measures time in quarters. The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path. Inflation and nominal interest rate are given in annualized percentage points. The other variables are in percentages.
Figure A.10 – Home Productivity Shock: $\theta^{fh} = 0.7, \theta^{hf} = 0.7$

Notes: The impulse responses are computed through simulations using the values in table 3. The horizontal axis measures time in quarters. The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path. Inflation and nominal interest rate are given in annualized percentage points. The other variables are in percentages.
Figure A.11 - Home Productivity Shock: $\theta^{fh} = 0.7, \theta^{hf} = 0.7$

Notes: The impulse responses are computed through simulations using the values in table 3. The horizontal axis measures time in quarters. The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path. Inflation and nominal interest rate are given in annualized percentage points. The other variables are in percentages.
Figure B.1 – Expansionary Monetary Contractions

(a) Home GDP

(b) Foreign GDP

(c) Home Terms of Trade

(d) Foreign Terms of Trade

(e) Home Import Price Inflation

(f) Real Exchange Rate

Notes: $\theta^{hf} = 0.9, \theta^{fh} = 0.1, \eta = 2$. Remaining parameters are calibrated to values in table 3. The horizontal axis measures time in quarters. The vertical axis units are deviations from the unshocked path. Inflation and nominal interest rate are given in annualized percentage points. The other variables are in percentages.
C Model With Sticky Wages  

Household Problem is to maximize utility given by:

\[
\max \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\beta \theta^h w)^j E_t(U_{t+j}(C_{t+j}, H_{t+j}, N_{t+j}(h))) \quad (C.1)
\]

Subject to the per period budget constraint given by:

\[
P_{t,cpi} C_t + \int_s \mu_{t,t+1}(s) D_{t+1}(s) \leq W_t N_t + D_t + T_t \quad (C.2)
\]

and the labor demand schedule given by:

\[
N_t(j) = \left(\frac{W_t(j)}{W^h_t}\right)^{-\eta} N_t \forall t \quad (C.3)
\]

Here \((1 - \theta_w)\) denotes the time invariant probability of readjusting wages in a given period.

The first-order condition implies the following expression for the wage negotiated by households who optimize in a given period:

\[
W^*_t = \sum_j (\beta \theta_w)^j E_t(N_{t+j}(h)U_N(t+j)) \quad (C.4)
\]

Which linearizes to:

\[
\hat{w}^*_t = (\beta \theta_w) E_t(\hat{w}^*_{t+1}) + (1 - \beta \theta_w) \left(\hat{U}_N(t) - \hat{U}_c(t) + \hat{p}_c(t)\right) \quad (C.5)
\]

The aggregate wage evolves according to the following equation:

\[
\hat{w}_t = (1 - \theta_w) \hat{w}^*_t + \theta_w \hat{w}_{t-1} \quad (C.6)
\]

Combining (C.5) and (C.6), we can write the Phillips curve analogue of real wage inflation as follows:
\[ \hat{w}_t = \frac{\beta \theta_w}{1 + \beta \theta_w^2} E_t \hat{w}_{t+1} + \frac{\theta_w}{1 + \beta \theta_w^2} \hat{w}_{t-1} + \frac{(1 - \beta \theta_w)(1 - \theta_w)}{1 + \beta \theta_w^2} (\hat{U}_N(t) - \hat{U}_c(t) + \hat{p}_c(t)) \]  

(D.7)

### D Bayesian Estimation Preliminaries

Let \( M \) denote a generic model and let \( \theta_M \) be the vector of parameters associated with it. Let \( Y \) denote the data that is used to estimate the model (note that \( Y \) does not have an \( M \) subscript, i.e. it is assumed that the data used is the estimation routine is constant across models). Bayesian estimation proceeds by specifying a prior distribution over \( \theta_M \) which is denoted here by \( P(M, \theta_M) \). The prior is then combined with the likelihood computed using the data to form the posterior distribution of parameters as follows:

\[ P(\theta_M | M, Y) \propto P(Y | M, \theta_M) P(M, \theta_M) \]  

(D.1)

Draws from the posterior distribution are generated by applying the Gibbs Sampler using standard Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques.\(^{33}\)

#### Model Selection

The marginal density of the data given the model \( M \) is given by:

\[ P(Y | M) = \int_{\theta_M} P(Y | M, \theta_M) P(M, \theta_M) \]  

(D.2)

This quantity has the interpretation of being the probability of observing

\(^{33}\)See Koop et al. (2007) for an overview of MCMC techniques.
the data given the true model is $M$. In order to compare two models $M_1$ and $M_2$, first the prior odds are specified for both models. These are then combined with the marginal densities to obtain posterior odds ratios which are used for the purpose of model comparison.

$$PO_{1/2} = \frac{P(Y|M_1)P(M_1)}{P(Y|M_2)P(M_2)}$$  \hspace{1cm} (D.3)

One advantage of the Bayesian framework is that the models do not have to be nested.\textsuperscript{34} Throughout this paper, a non informative prior is assumed on the models ($P(M_1) = P(M_2) = 0.5$) so that the ratio of marginal data densities is equal to the posterior odds ratio, which in this case is also equal to the frequently quoted statistic called the Bayes factor.

E Parameter Estimates for Model With Importer Interest Rate

Trade Finance<Online Appendix: Not for Publication>

F Bayesian Estimation Robustness Checks<Online Appendix: Not for Publication>

The parameters quantifying import price flexibility as well as the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to the risk free rate are critical in determining the role played by trade finance in propagation of business cycle shocks. This section conducts a series of robustness checks with regard to these parameters.

\textsuperscript{34}Note however that in order for the data densities to be comparable, the data used in estimating the two models should be the same and the priors should be proper (i.e they should define a valid distribution that integrates to one). These conditions will be imposed throughout the paper in order to keep the model comparisons valid.
Table 9 – Summary of Prior and Posterior Distribution of Estimated Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Prior Distribution</th>
<th>Prior Mean</th>
<th>Prior Stdev</th>
<th>Posterior Mean</th>
<th>Posterior 90% C.I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \theta_{US} )</td>
<td>Calvo Domestic</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.8507</td>
<td>0.815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \theta_{US} ) Import</td>
<td>Calvo Import</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.3525</td>
<td>0.2044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \theta_{EU} ) Import</td>
<td>Calvo Import</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.8029</td>
<td>0.6366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \theta_{EU} )</td>
<td>Calvo Domestic</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.7494</td>
<td>0.6947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma_{c} )</td>
<td>Intertemporal Elasticity</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4.4685</td>
<td>3.288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma_{L} )</td>
<td>Labor supply Elasticity</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.6053</td>
<td>1.0014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( h )</td>
<td>Habit Parameter</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5452</td>
<td>0.3916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta )</td>
<td>Intra Temporal Elasticity</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.4044</td>
<td>0.2543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \phi_{US}^{\pi} )</td>
<td>Taylor Rule Parameter</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.8714</td>
<td>1.5407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \phi_{US}^{y} )</td>
<td>Taylor Rule Parameter</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.4654</td>
<td>0.2106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \phi_{US}^{c} )</td>
<td>Taylor Rule Parameter</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.0312</td>
<td>0.0099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \phi_{EU}^{\pi} )</td>
<td>Taylor Rule Parameter</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.8547</td>
<td>1.5163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \phi_{EU}^{y} )</td>
<td>Taylor Rule Parameter</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.5387</td>
<td>0.2365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \phi_{EU}^{c} )</td>
<td>Taylor Rule Parameter</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.0271</td>
<td>0.0077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho_{US}^{A} )</td>
<td>US TFP Persistence</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.7892</td>
<td>0.7149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho_{US}^{R} )</td>
<td>US Interest rate Smoothing</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8247</td>
<td>0.794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho_{US}^{G} )</td>
<td>US Government spending Persistence</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.9655</td>
<td>0.9463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho_{EU}^{A} )</td>
<td>EU TFP Persistence</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5841</td>
<td>0.2818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho_{EU}^{R} )</td>
<td>EU Interest rate Smoothing</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8633</td>
<td>0.8372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho_{EU}^{G} )</td>
<td>EU Government spending Persistence</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.9275</td>
<td>0.8869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho_{Z} )</td>
<td>Global Productivity Persistence</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.4494</td>
<td>0.2541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \delta^{EU\rightarrow US} )</td>
<td>Trade Finance Parameter: US</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>2.1414</td>
<td>0.9446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \delta^{US\rightarrow EU} )</td>
<td>Trade Finance Parameter: US</td>
<td>gamma</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>2.1258</td>
<td>0.8294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho_{N}^{US} )</td>
<td>US Labor Supply Shock persistence</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.9989</td>
<td>0.9989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho_{N}^{EU} )</td>
<td>EU Labor Supply Shock persistence</td>
<td>beta</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.8859</td>
<td>0.8352</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The results are based on 200,000 MCMC draws (split across 2 chains) after burn in with the posterior mode used as the starting value for each parameter.
Table 10 – Posterior Means of Key Parameters Under Different Model Assumptions/Restrictions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\theta_{\text{US Import}}$</th>
<th>$\theta_{\text{EU Import}}$</th>
<th>$\delta_{\text{EU}\rightarrow\text{US}}$</th>
<th>$\delta_{\text{US}\rightarrow\text{EU}}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_c = 1$</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta = 1$</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Cost Channel</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sticky Wages</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The prior mean and standard deviation of the parameters is the same as that in the benchmark case (table 6) except when indicated in the first column.

Table 10 reports posterior means of these parameters under different variations of the model. For each of the cases reported in table 10, the prior mean and standard deviation of the parameters is the same as that in the benchmark case (table 6) except when indicated in the first column.

Since the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is estimated to be somewhat higher in comparison to the literature in the baseline case, the first row considers a model with log utility. The second row considers another restriction on the model by fixing the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign bundles. As argued before, there is little consensus in the value of this parameter in the literature and a value of 1 can be considered a compromise between the trade and business cycle literatures.\(^{35}\) The third row considers a model in which the cost channel of monetary policy is operational even in the domestic sector, i.e even the goods-producing firms are required to borrow in order to finance their wage bill. This is typically how the cost channel of monetary policy has been modeled in the literature so far.\(^{36}\) As is evident form the results reported in the table, the estimates of the main parameters of interest are robust to all these departures from the baseline version of the

\(^{35}\)A more thorough approach would be to allow for dynamic elasticities as discussed in Drozd et al. (2014) and Crucini and Davis (2013). However, this approach is not undertaken since the main message of the paper is robust to the value of the elasticity used.

\(^{36}\)See for instance Christiano et al. (2005), Barth III and Ramey (2002) and Ravina (2007)
model.

G Estimated Impulse Responses for non-monetary Shocks<Online Appendix: Not for Publication>

H Data: <Online Appendix: Not for Publication>

H.1 Correlations and Plots

This appendix provides the details and sources for the data used in the empirical part of the paper. Unless otherwise mentioned, the data is at quarterly frequency from 1983Q1-2007Q4. It is seasonally adjusted and demeaned before estimation.

US Data

- $R^{US}$: Effective Federal funds Rate, nominal, annualized, percentage
- $\Delta Y^{US}$: Quarter to quarter growth rate of GDP per capita computed as follows:
  \[
  \Delta Y_t^{US} = 100 \left[ \log \left( \frac{GDP_t}{POP_t} \right) - \log \left( \frac{GDP_{t-1}}{POP_{t-1}} \right) \right]
  \]
  - Note: Nominal GDP is converted to real using the GDP deflator.
- CPI inflation:
  \[
  \pi_t^{CPI,US} = 400 \left[ \log(CPI_t) - \log(CPI_{t-1}) \right]
  \]
- GDP Deflator Inflation:
**Figure G.1 – US Labor Supply Shock**

(a) Home GDP

(b) Foreign GDP

(c) Home Nominal Interest

(d) Foreign Nominal Interest

(e) Home TOT

(f) RER

(g) US Imports

- Estimated with Trade Finance (Median and 90% CI)
- Simulated w/o Trade Finance
- Estimated w/o Trade Finance (Median)
Figure G.2 – US Productivity Shock

(a) Home GDP

(b) Foreign GDP

(c) Home Nominal Interest

(d) Foreign Nominal Interest

(e) Home TOT

(f) RER

(g) US Imports

Note: Baseline model (dotted line) assumes US interest rate trade finance.
Table 11 – Correlations Between Observables Used in Estimation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\Delta Y^{US}$</th>
<th>$i^{US}$</th>
<th>$\pi^{CPI,US}$</th>
<th>$\pi^{GDP,US}$</th>
<th>$\Delta Y^{EU}$</th>
<th>$i^{EU}$</th>
<th>$\pi^{CPI,EU}$</th>
<th>$\pi^{GDP,EU}$</th>
<th>$\Delta E$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta Y^{US}$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$i^{US}$</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi^{CPI,US}$</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi^{GDP,US}$</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>0.627</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi^{IM,US}$</td>
<td>-0.098</td>
<td>-0.199</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta Y^{EU}$</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$i^{EU}$</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.063</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi^{CPI,EU}$</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>0.552</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
<td>0.649</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi^{GDP,EU}$</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0.732</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta E$</td>
<td>-0.156</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.195</td>
<td>0.409</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>-0.242</td>
<td>-0.243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Figure H.1** – Time series Plots of Data Used in Estimation

(a) US Inflation Rates

(b) EU Inflation Rates

(c) US GDP Growth Rate

(d) EU GDP Growth Rate

(e) Nominal Interest Rates

(f) Nominal Depreciation

Notes: This figure plots the 10 time series used in the estimation. All data is at quarterly frequency from 2003Q1-2007Q4 and is seasonally adjusted and demeaned.
\[ -\pi_t^{GDP,US} = 400 \left[ \log (GDP_{DEF_t}) - \log (GDP_{DEF_{t-1}}) \right] \]

- Import Price Inflation

\[ -\pi_t^{IM,US} = 400 \left[ \log (P_{IM,t}) - \log (P_{IM,t-1}) \right] \]

Data Sources: The data for the US block is taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). The data on population is taken from Ramey (2011)’s publicly available dataset.

**EU data**

- \( R^{EU} \): Effective Federal funds Rate, nominal, annualized, percentage

- \( \Delta Y^{EU} \): Quarter to quarter growth rate of GDP per capita computed as follows:

\[ \Delta Y_t^{EU} = 100 \left[ \log \left( \frac{GDP_t}{POP_t} \right) - \log \left( \frac{GDP_{t-1}}{POP_{t-1}} \right) \right] \]

  - Note: Nominal GDP is converted to real using the GDP deflator.

- CPI inflation:

\[ \pi_t^{CPI,EU} = 400 \left[ \log (CPI_t) - \log (CPI_{t-1}) \right] \]

- GDP Deflator Inflation:

\[ -\pi_t^{GDP,EU} = 400 \left[ \log (GDP_{DEF_t}) - \log (GDP_{DEF_{t-1}}) \right] \]

- Nominal Exchange rate Depreciation:

\[ -\Delta E_t = \log (E_t) - \log (E_{t-1}) \]

Data Sources: The data for the EU block is taken from the European Central Bank (ECB) Area Wide Model (AWM) database. The nominal effective exchange rate series before 2000 is taken from Lubik and Schorfheide (2006)’s publicly available database.
Trade Data

- Bilateral trade data between US and European Union at quarterly frequency is taken from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). The database only covers merchandise trade and is used in this paper as a proxy for total trade.

\[
\begin{align*}
\Delta \frac{\text{trade}}{\text{GDP}} &= 100 \left[ \log \left( \frac{\text{Exports}_t + \text{Imports}_t}{\text{GDP}^\text{US}_t} \right) - \log \left( \frac{\text{Exports}_{t-1} + \text{Imports}_{t-1}}{\text{GDP}^\text{US}_{t-1}} \right) \right] \\
\text{(H.1)}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\Delta \frac{\text{Import}}{\text{GDP}} &= 100 \left[ \log \left( \frac{\text{Imports}_t}{\text{GDP}_t} \right) - \log \left( \frac{\text{Imports}_{t-1}}{\text{GDP}^\text{US}_{t-1}} \right) \right] \\
\text{(H.2)}
\end{align*}
\]